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Chapter 1
Introduction
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was held
in 1992 and the Conference of the Parties (COP) adopted this framework
with the aim of preventing global warming. At COP19 in Warsaw, Poland in
November 2013, a list was drafted of voluntary reduction goals to be achieved
by COP21, which will be held in Paris in 2015. New measures to try to reduce
greenhouse gases are being seen almost every day.
In the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted at COP3 (Kyoto Conference)
in December 1997, emissions trading systems were defined as systems that
lead to the efficient reduction of greenhouses gases, and the introduction of
emissions trading has since progressed around the world. Emissions trad-
ing has already been introduced in the European Union, some states of the
United States, Canada, and New Zealand, and efforts are being made to
introduce it into Australia, China, and Korea.
Emissions trading aims to regulate total emissions, but in recent years,
some countries have set a goal of reducing the emission rate. Emission rate is
the quantity of greenhouse gas emission per unit of output (GDP). China set
a target of a 40–45% reduction in emissions rates by 2020 compared to 2005
levels. Similarly, India has set a target of a 20–25% reduction and Malaysia
a 40% reduction. Furthermore, in Japan, since 1998, as a voluntary envi-
ronmental action plan, the Federation of Economic Organizations (Nippon
Keidanren) has published a target value and the actual value of the emission
rate of domestic industry. Thus, while some countries have a target value
for the reduction of emissions, environmental regulation of emission rates
will draw attention no matter what effect it has on the environment and the
economy.
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Based on this, this thesis aims to investigate the following points, which
have not been analyzed in previous studies: When direct rate-based regula-
tion is introduced, how should the government set the emission rate? When
the government sets the emission rate incorrectly, how much additional abate-
ment cost is generated? How does the impact on the economy differ between
rate-based regulation and total emission control? What kind of impact is
there on GDP and emissions under rate-based regulation?
The remider of the thesis is organized as follows. We analyze in Chapter
Two the effects of the direct regulation of the emission rate on the Japanese
economy. When exogenously changing the value of the emission rate for each
industry, we calculate how to change the total reduction cost. In Chapter
Three, we perform a theoretical analysis of emissions trading using rate-
based policy which is considered to be one of the means by which to realize
emission rate targets, and to distribute free emission permits according to the
emission rate. In Chapter Four, we simulate the introduction of a domestic
emissions trading scheme in Japan using the rate-based policy analyzed in
Chapter Three. We also compare the rate-based policy and the cap-and-trade
policy which regulates total emission. Chapter Five presents our concluding
remarks.
We note that Chapter Two differs substantially from Chapters Three and
Four. In Chapter Two, we analyze the direct regulation of the emission rate,
and in Chapters Three and Four, we analyze the rate-based policy which tries
to achieve emission rate targets by allocating emission permits according to
the amount of output. At present, no countries have adopted the rate-based
policy; however, this policy can be considered as a method by which a country
can achieve its desired emission rate.
It should be noted that at COP19, Japan announced a new goal of re-
ducing the 2005 greenhouse gas ratio by 3.8% by 2020. Since the analysis in
this paper was carried out before the new goal was announced, analysis was
carried out with the previous goal of a 25% reduction of 1990 levels by 2020.
In addition, in the analysis, carbon dioxide is treated as the only greenhouse
gas.
9
Chapter 2
Estimation of marginal
abatement cost and rate-based
regulation
2.1 Introduction
In Japan, the Bill of the Basic Act on Global Warming Countermeasures was
approved by the Cabinet on March 12, 2010. It defines the basic principles
for achieving a 25% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels
by 2020. In the bill, an emissions trading scheme will contribute significantly
to the 25% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Paramount to the bill
is a cap-and-trade policy to impose an upper limit on the total amount
of greenhouse gas emissions, but it also includes rate-based regulation that
mandates the reduction of emissions per output unit.
In rate-based regulation, even if it is possible to achieve the desired emis-
sion rate by increasing emission efficiency, the total emissions increase when
output is increased. However, the introduction of rate-based regulation is
desirable from the viewpoint of some industries and the labor unions. This
is because even if the output increases more than the emission rate, the
emission rate is improvable.
In this chapter, our analysis assumes that rate-based regulation has been
introduced in industries in Japan that produce substantial amounts of carbon
dioxide emissions, including iron and steel (iron), chemical (chem), ceramic,
stone, and clay (nmm), and pulp and paper (pulp).
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According to the Greenhouse gas report (April 2010) of the National
Institute for Environmental Studies in Japan, carbon dioxide emissions from
the industrial sector in 2008 was 387 million tons (MtCO2), of which iron
is 143MtCO2 (37%), chem is 563MtCO2 (14%), nmm is 47MtCO2 (12%)
and pulp is 23MtCO2 (6%). These four industries account for nearly 70%
of total carbon dioxide emssions. Therefore, introducing policies to facilitate
the reduction of emissions in these industries is considered to be an effective
approach.
We analyze the introduction of rate-based regulation in these four indus-
tries. With rate-based regulation, the government sets the emission rate for
each industry; however, depending on the setting, the cost to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions will increase or decrease in some industries. That is, it is
necessary for the government to set the emission rate so as to achieve a 25%
reduction and minimize the cost to the entire industry. We calculate the
value of the emission rate that the government should set to minimize the
total abatement cost. To set an optimal emission rate, information on the
marginal abatement cost is necessary. When there is information asymmetry,
the government might set an emission rate that is different from the efficient
level. We investigate how the total abatement cost will change when the
government incorrectly sets the value of the emission rate. Bo¨hringer et al.
(2006) analyzed the variation of the total abatement cost when changing the
number of industries participating in cap-and-trade emissions trading in Ger-
many. In this chapter, we analyze changes in the total abatement cost due to
changes in the emission rate set by the government in rate-based regulation.
Fischer (2001) conducted a theoretical study of rate-based regulation.
In Fischer (2001), regulators distribute free emission permits according to
industry output; this makes it possible to realize the target emission rate.
Fischer (2001) reports that emissions become excessive by regulating the
emission rate, and this generates a welfare loss. However, there is no empirical
analysis of rate-based regulation in Japan. In this chapter, we find that the
total abatement cost can be excessive if the government sets even a slightly
incorrect emission rate from the optimal level.
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2.2 Profit function and marginal abatement
cost function
In this section, we derive the marginal abatement cost function and profit
function for each industry. Let us define the following profit function with
reference to the formulation of Yiannaka et al. (2001) and Nakano (2004):
Πt = Π(Et)
= B(Et)− C(Et) (2.1)
where Πt is the profit of the industry in period t, E is the amount of emissions,
and B(Et) and C(Et) are added value function (benefit function) and cost
function respectively. The cost is assumed to comprise the capital rental cost
and labor cost, but not the cost for intermediate input. We define the profit
function and the benefit function as follows:
Πt = B(Et)− C(Et)
= aEbt e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 − C(Et) (2.2)
where t is the time period, which is from 1970 to 2008 in this chapter, b is
the elasticity with respect to the carbon dioxide emissions of added value,
and T is a time trend where T = 1 represents the year 1970. cT + 1
2
dT 2 is a
quadratic function that takes into account technological progress, it indicates
that the technical level will increase as time passes.
Here, in the case where carbon dioxide emissions increase at an average
growth rate during the analysis period, the emissions are defined as business-
as-usual (BaU) emissions E¯t. On the other hand, during the analysis period
when emission reduction methods are performed, emissions are defined as E˜t.
In addition, when maximizing profits for emissions level E¯t, the following is
satisfied:
dΠ(E¯t)
dEt
= 0 (2.3)
(2.2) can then be reduced to
abE¯b−1t e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 − dC(E¯t)
dEt
= 0
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Thus,
dC(E¯t)
dEt
= abE¯b−1t e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 (2.4)
Next, the marginal cost function MAC can be expressed as follows:
MAC =
Π(E¯t)− Π(E˜t)
E¯t − E˜t
(2.5)
Here, the profit function can be approximated using Taylor expansion as
follows:
Π(E¯t)
.
=· Π(E˜t) +
dΠ(E˜t)
dEt
(E¯t − E˜t) (2.6)
Using (2.6), (2.5) reduces to
MAC =
dΠ(E˜t)
dEt
(E¯t − E˜t)
E¯t − E˜t
= abE˜b−1t e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 − dC(E˜t)
dEt
(2.7)
The cost function is then assumed to be linear without a constant term, as
follows:
C(Et) = gEte
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 (2.8)
From (2.8), we have
dC(E¯t)
dEt
=
dC(E˜t)
dEt
= gecT+
1
2
dT 2 (2.9)
From (2.4) and (2.9), we can derive
abE¯b−1t e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 = gecT+
1
2
dT 2
Thus,
g = abE¯b−1t (2.10)
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Therefore, using (2.4) and (2.9), we can rewrite (2.7) as follows:
MAC = abE˜b−1t e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 − dC(E¯t)
dEt
= ab(E˜b−1t − E¯b−1t )ecT+
1
2
dT 2 (2.11)
Additionally, from (2.8) and (2.10), (2.2) becomes
Πt = aE
b
t e
cT+ 1
2
dT 2 − C(Et)
= a(Ebt − E¯b−1t Et)ecT+
1
2
dT 2 (2.12)
In section 2.5, in order to estimate the profit function, we use the following
estimation equation taking natural log of the benefit function:
lnB(Et) = A+ b lnEt + cT +
1
2
dT 2 + ut (2.13)
where A denotes ln a and ut is the error term. In this chapter, with carbon
dioxide emissions data and the value added of iron, chem, nmm, and pulp
from 1970 to 2008, using (2.13), we can estimate the value of A, b, c and d
using the OLS.
2.3 Data
Using the carbon dioxide emissions data and the value added of steel, chem,
nmm, and pulp from 1970 to 2008, we estimate the marginal abatement cost
function and the profit function for each industry.
In order to determine the value added of each industry, we use the real
gross domestic product of producer prices listed in the National Accounts
Annual Report (base year = 2000), which was created by the Economic and
Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. However, since the system of na-
tional accounts changed, there is a discontinuity in the data between 1989
and 1990. Therefore, we create continuous data by multiplying the data for
1990 and onward by the growth rate of value added from 1970 to 1990.
Next, the carbon dioxide emissions of each industry are calculated by
using a carbon dioxide conversion factor taken from the energy consumption
of each year. The energy consumption data for 1970 to 1997 were obtained
from General Energy Statistics (2011 edition), which was created by the
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Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s Agency for Natural Resources
and Energy Research Secretariat Planning and Research Division, and the
data for 1998 to 2008 were obtained from the total energy supply and balance
table in the EDMC Handbook of Energy & Economic Statistics (2000–2010
edition), which was issued by the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan.
The amount of carbon dioxide emissions was calculated for each industry
by multiplying the energy source of the carbon dioxide equivalent coefficient
from 3EID (Embodied Energy and Emission Intensity Data for Japan Using
Input–Output Tables, Nansai et al. 2002) by the amount of energy consumed.
2.4 Unit root test and co-integration test
In order to estimate (2.13) using OLS with the time series data of carbon diox-
ide emissions and the amount of value added, it is necessary to perform unit
root tests to determine whether these data are stationary or non-stationary.
We used the augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF test) for the unit root tests.
The results are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
From Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the values of lnB(Et) and lnEt are non-stationary
data because we cannot reject the null hypothesis that each industry has a
unit root. However, they become steady data when taking the first differ-
ence in all industries. Therefore, lnB(Et) and lnEt are confirmed as I(1)
variables.
Even if the time series data are non-stationary, when lnB(Et) and lnEt
are I(1) variables and the error term ut is an I(0) variable, lnB(Et) and
lnEt have a cointergration relationship. At this point, it is possible to apply
regression analysis to lnB(Et) and lnEt. Thus, we conduct a cointegration
test using the Johansen test for the four industries.
We find that there is a cointegration relationship in the lnB(Et) and lnEt
of iron and chem at the 5% significance level, but there is no cointegration
relationship in lnB(Et) and lnEt in nmm and pulp. Therefore, it is valid to
perform OLS for iron and chem, but in this chapter, it is assumed that we
performed OLS for nmm and pulp.
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2.5 Estimation
2.5.1 Estimation of profit function
In this subsection, we estimate the profit function for the four industries,
iron, chem, nmm and pulp. We use (2.13), which calculates the natural
logarithm of the benefit function B(Et) as the estimating equation.
Using the carbon dioxide emissions data and the value added of the four
industries from 1970 to 2008, using (2.13), we can estimate the values of A,
b, c, and d using OLS; these results are shown in Table 2.3. From Table
2.3, we can see that nmm and pulp have coefficients that are not significant.
However, in this chapter, we assume that these coefficients are also used.
Using the values in Table 2.3, the benefit functions of the four industries can
be expressed as follows:
iron B(Et) = 220092E
0.86
t e
0.057T+0.0012T 2
chem B(Et) = 17336246E
0.62
t e
0.14T−0.0024T 2
nmm B(Et) = 25177216E
0.66
t e
0.017T−0.00016T 2
pulp B(Et) = 151617994448E
0.13
t e
0.066T+0.00125T 2
From this, the profit functions of the four industries can be expressed as
follows:
iron Πt = 220092(E
0.86
t − E¯−0.14t Et)e0.057T+0.0012T 2
chem Πt = 17336246(E
0.62
t − E¯−0.38t Et)e0.14T−0.0024T 2
nmm Πt = 25177216(E
0.66
t − E¯−0.34t Et)e0.017T−0.00016T 2
pulp Πt = 151617994448(E
0.13
t − E¯−0.87t Et)e0.066T+0.00125T 2
2.5.2 Estimation of marginal abatement cost function
In this subsection, we estimate the marginal abatement cost function of iron,
chem, nmm, and pulp. Once again, (2.11) is the marginal abatement cost
function.
MAC = ab(E˜b−1t − E¯b−1t )ecT+
1
2
dT 2 (2.11)
Here, we consider the marginal abatement cost to be t = 2020. E¯2020 (here-
after denoted by E¯) represents carbon dioxide emissions in the BaU scenario
in the absence of efforts to reduce emissions, and E˜2020 (hereafter denoted by
16
E) represents carbon dioxide emissions under reduction efforts. We can cal-
culate E¯ for the year 2020 by using the average growth rate of carbon dioxide
emissions in the analysis period. Table 2.4 shows the calculation results. In
addition, we also present in Table 2.5 the result of the marginal abatement
cost calculation. The values in Table 2.5 are shown in graph form in Figure
2.1.
2.6 Determination of optimal emission rate
In this section, when it is assumed that rate-based regulation has been im-
plemented, the carbon dioxide emissions target set by the government can be
achieved, and the emission rate is calculated to minimize the total abatement
cost. The emission rate represents the amount of carbon dioxide emissions
per added value. Therefore, the optimal emission rate is the ratio of emissions
to value added that is achieved when the marginal benefit of each industry
is equalized.
In 2020 (T = 51), the marginal benefit function of industry i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
can be expressed as follows:
MBi = aibi(E
bi−1
i − E¯bi−1i )e51ci+
1
2
·512di (2.14)
(2.14) can be tranformed to become
Ei =
[
MBi + aibiE¯
bi−1
i e
51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
] 1
bi−1
(2.15)
Here, Eˆ is the carbon dioxide emissions target set by the government. By
considering that the marginal benefit for each industry becomes equal to p,
the following equation is satisfied using (2.15):
4∑
i=1
Ei =
4∑
i=1
[
p+ aibiE¯
bi−1
i e
51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
] 1
bi−1
= Eˆ (2.16)
We insert ai, bi, ci, and di from Table 2.4 into (2.16), and since it is necessary
to insert the emissions level in 2020 that comprises a 25% reduction compared
to 1990 into Eˆ, we adopt Eˆ (22.4MtCO2) as the value of 75% of the total
carbon dioxide emissions of the four industries in 1990. Calculating this gives
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p = 657. This value is the marginal benefit of each industry; in other words,
when emissions trading is implemented using the cap-and-trade policy, the
permit price is 657 yen.
When we insert p = 657 into MBi in (2.15), it is possible to obtain
the optimum emissions E∗i of each industry. Further, when we insert each
benefit function of each industry into the optimal emissions, we obtain the
added value under optimal choice. Then, by dividing E∗i by Bi(E
∗
i ), we can
determine the optimum emission rate. The results of this calculation are
shown in Table 2.6.
2.7 Relationship between emission rate and
total abatement cost
2.7.1 Iron industry
In this subsection, with the introduction of rate-based regulation for the four
industries, we analyze the total abatement cost when the government changes
the emission rate. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the introduction of
rate-based regulation in only one of the four industries at a time. In this
subsection, we analyze the case where this regulation is introduced into iron.
Since iron has the highest amount of emissions among the four industries, iron
must reduce missions most when emissions trading is introduced. Therefore,
we expect that the introduction of rate-based regulation is most desirable for
iron.
Here, regarding the emissions regulation imposed on iron (i = 1) as α,
the amount of emissions for iron is expressed as follows:
E1 = αB1(E1) (2.17)
By (2.17), emissions E1 are expressed as follows:
E1 = αa1E
b1
1 e
51c1+
1
2
·512d1
Thus,
E1 =
[
αa1e
51c1+1300.5d1
]−(b1−1)
(2.18)
(2.18) expresses the relationship between E1 and α.
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The profit function of iron is calculated by (2.12) and (2.18). When E1
from (2.12) is inserted into (2.18), we can derive the following equation. In
order to prevent complicating the formula, we substitute values for a1, b1, c1,
and d1.
Π1 = a1
[
{αB1(E1)}b1 − E¯b1−1t αB1(E1)
]
e51c1+1300.5d1
= a1
[{
αa1E
b1
1 e
51c1+1300.5d1
}b1 − E¯b1−1t αa1Eb11 e51c1+1300.5d1] (2.19)
Next, we suppose the total abatement cost TC1 for iron to be the difference
between the BaU profits Π¯1 and Π1 as follows:
TC1 = Π¯1 − Π1 (2.20)
This equation can give us the BaU profits Π¯i of each industry in 2020 when
we insert the BaU emissions for the profit function. Table 2.7 shows the
values obtained.
From (2.19) and (2.20) we have
TC1 = Π¯1 − a1
[{
αa1E
b1
1 e
51c1+1300.5d1
}b1
−E¯b1−1t αa1Eb11 e51c1+1300.5d1
]
e51c1+1300.5d1 (2.21)
In addition, by (2.21) and (2.18), we have
TC1 = Π¯1 − a1
{αa1( 1
αa1e51c1+1300.5d1
) b1
b1−1
e51c1+1300.5d1
}b1
−E¯b1−1t αa1
(
1
αa1e51c1+1300.5d1
) b1
b1−1
e51c1+1300.5d1
]
e51c1+1300.5d1
(2.22)
Since Π¯1, a1, b1, c1, and d1 are known, (2.22) expresses the relationship
between α and TC1. Next, by combining (2.16) and (2.18), we have
[
αa1e
51c1+1300.5d1
]−(b1−1)
+
4∑
i=2
[
p+ aibiE¯
bi−1
i e
51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
] 1
bi−1
= Eˆ
(2.23)
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(2.23) represents the relationship between emission rate α and permit price p.
Finally, we give the total abatement cost of chem, nmm and pulp (i = 2, 3, 4).
By (2.12), (2.16), and (2.20), we can derive the following:
TC1 = Π¯i − Πi
= Π¯i − ai
(p+ aibiE¯bi−1i e51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
) bi
bi−1
−E¯bi−1i
(
p+ aibiE¯
bi−1
i e
51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
) 1
bi−1
 e51ci+1300.5di i = 2, 3, 4
(2.24)
(2.24) represents the relationship between the total abatement cost TC1 and
permit price p. From (2.22) and (2.24), the total abatement cost TC is given
by
TC =
4∑
i=1
TCi
= TC1 +
4∑
i=2
TCi
= Π¯1 − a1
{αa1( 1
αa1e51c1+1300.5d1
) b1
b1−1
e51c1+1300.5d1
}b1
−E¯b1−1t αa1
(
1
αa1e51c1+1300.5d1
) b1
b1−1
e51c1+1300.5d1
]
e51c1+1300.5d1
+
4∑
i=2
Π¯i − ai

(
p+ aibiE¯
bi−1
i e
51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
) bi
bi−1
−E¯bi−1i
[
p+ aibiE¯
bi−1
i e
51ci+1300.5di
aibie51ci+1300.5di
] 1
bi−1
 e51ci+1300.5di
 (2.25)
(2.25) represents the relationships among the total abatement cost TC, emis-
sion rate α and permit price p. Since (2.23) shows the relationship between
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emission rate α and permit price p, from (2.23) and (2.25), we can obtain
the relationship between the total abatement cost TC and emission rate α.
We show this relationship in Figure 2.2.
As Table 2.2 shows, the total abatement cost is 17.8 billion yen when
the emission rate is α∗ = 73 (tCO2/million yen), as shown in Table 2.6.
We estimate that the total cost reduction increases by about 3.6 billion yen
when the government incorrectly sets the emission rate—for example, when
the emission rate is 1% higher than the optimum.
2.7.2 Ceramic and clay industry
In subsection 2.7.1, we analyzed the introduction of rate-based regulation to
the iron industry only. However, in this subsection, we consider the case of
the introduction of rate-based regulation only to nmm, which has the highest
marginal abatement cost. For high marginal abatement cost industries, there
are higher costs for reduction efforts when emissions trading is introduced, so
it is expected that the introduction of rate-based regulation is desirable for
these industries. We determined the relationship between the total abate-
ment cost TC and emission rate α in subsection 2.7.1, and the results can be
seen in Figure 2.3.
From Figure 2.3, we can see that the total abatement cost is 17.8 billion
yen when the emission rate is α∗ = 9.4 (tCO2/million yen). We estimate that
the total cost reduction increases by about 0.37 billion yen when the gov-
ernment incorrectly sets the emission rate—for example, when the emission
rate is 1% higher than the optimal. However, even if the government sets
the wrong emission rate, the total abatement cost is smaller than it is for the
iron industry. In other words, by introducing rate-based regulation for high
marginal abatement cost industries, the total abatement cost is relatively low
even if the government makes a mistake in setting the emission rate.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, with the target of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 25%
of 1990 levels by 2020, we assumed that rate-based regulation had been intro-
duced into industries that emit a great deal of carbon dioxide: Japan’s iron
and steel; chemical; ceramic, stone, and clay; and pulp and paper industries.
To reduce emissions by 25% in these four industries, the cost would be
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about 17.8 billion yen. This cost can be adjusted to the amount of the
total abatement cost if the government has set an optimum emission rate.
However, setting the emission rate is difficult, and it is possible that the
government may set an incorrect rate. For example, if the government set
the emission rate 1% higher than the optimal level for the iron and steel
industry only, we estimate that the total cost would increase by about 3.6
billion yen. Moreover, if the government set the emission rate 1% higher than
the optimal level for the ceramic, stone, and clay industry only, we estimate
that the total cost would increase by about 0.37 billion yen. The increase
of the total abatement cost depends on the sector and it is more serious in
the iron and steel sector. In other words, the increase of the total abatement
cost is relatively low when the government sets an incorrect emission rate for
a sector in which the marginal cost of abatement is relatively low.
In this chapter, the analysis is based on the assumption that the regula-
tors are completely aware of the technological progress of each industry. The
rate-based regulation is preferred because it can easily realize the emission
rate of the target industry without significantly reducing output and emis-
sions with a rising technological level. However, in this chapter, because the
government has completely foreseen the technological progress of each indus-
try, it can directly regulate the emission rate. Moreover, the benefit function
is non-linear, and the direct regulation of the emission rate, added value, and
emissions for each industry are uniquely determined. Therefore, it should be
noted that it has substantially the same characteristics as controlling the
total volume of emissions.
Thus, in Chapter Three, we analyze the case where each industry deter-
mines the technological level endogenously and the government determines
the emission rate exogenously. By not setting the emission rate endogenously
(as in this chapter), it is assumed that there will be a focus on the difference
between the cap-and-trade policy and rate-based regulation.
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Table 2.1: Unit root test of lnB(Et)
lnB(Et)
Level First difference
ADF Augmented term ADF Augmented term
iron −1.45 k = 0 −4.92*** k = 0
chem −1.82 k = 0 −5.39*** k = 3
nmm −1.74 k = 0 −4.92*** k = 0
pulp −1.38 k = 0 −6.01*** k = 0
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level and k is the order
of the augmented term.
Table 2.2: Unit root test of lnEt
lnEt
Level First difference
ADF Augmented term ADF Augmented term
iron −2.88 k = 0 −5.29*** k = 1
chem −3.20* k = 0 −6.99*** k = 0
nmm −2.62 k = 1 −4.84*** k = 0
pulp −1.68 k = 1 −4.45*** k = 0
Note: *** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels,
respectively, and k is the order of the augmented term.
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Table 2.3: Results of OLS
iron chem nmm pulp
A 12.30** 16.67*** 17.04*** 25.74***
(-2.51) (-3.42) (-4.32) (-14.79)
b 0.86*** 0.62** 0.66*** 0.13
(-3.36) (-2.23) (-2.92) (-1.24)
c 0.057*** 0.14*** 0.017*** 0.066***
(-9.02) (-17.86) (-2.76) (-16.5)
d 0.0024*** -0.0048*** -0.00032 0.0025***
(-8.45) (-10.66) (-1.01) (-13.61)
R2 0.7121 0.9645 0.6849 0.9409
Note: *** and ** indicate statistical is given significance at the 1%
and 5% levels, respectively, and the t-value in parentheses.
Table 2.4: Business-as-usual CO2 emissions in 2020 (MtCO2)
iron chem nmm pulp
Emissions 154.1 67.9 37.7 23.5
Table 2.5: Marginal abatement cost in 2020 (yen/tCO2)
CO2 reduction iron chem nmm pulp
1% 16 129 238 72
5% 80 662 1,223 374
10% 164 1,374 2,535 788
15% 254 2,143 3,949 1,246
20% 350 2,977 5,478 1,758
25% 454 3,887 7,142 2,334
30% 565 4,884 8,961 2,986
35% 686 5,984 10,963 3,732
40% 819 7,208 13,183 4,593
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Table 2.6: Optimal CO2 emissions, added value, and emission rate
iron chem nmm pulp
CO2 emissions (MtCO2) 102 64.6 36.6 21.5
Added value (billion yen) 1,395 3,571 3,897 1,480
Emission rate (tCO2/million yen) 73.1 18.1 9.4 14.5
Table 2.7: Business-as-usual profits in 2020 (million yen)
iron chem nmm pulp
Profits 2,767 1,401 1,348 1,305
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Chapter 3
Theoretical comparison of
cap-and-trade policy and
rate-based policy
3.1 Introduction
In previous studies on the system design of emissions trading, cap-and-trade
policy with total control of emissions volume has been discussed the most
(Matumoto 2008; Maeda 2009). However, Japan’s government has proposed
introducing rate-based emission regulations for some industries in Japan.
The Global Warming Countermeasures Bill was submitted to the 174th ordi-
nary session of the Diet but was not passed. This bill reads as follows:
“While there is the basic need to determine the extent of the total amount
of greenhouse gas emissions during a given period of time, we also need to
take into account how to determine the extent of greenhouse gas emissions
per unit of output.”
Moreover, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment has discussed in
its council the introduction of the cap-and-trade and rate-based policies
(Japanese Ministry of the Environment 2010). In addition, both China and
India have set targets for greenhouse gas emissions per unit of gross do-
mestic product for the year 2020; in order to achieve their targets, both
countries may have to develop international or domestic emissions regula-
tions (Marschinski and Edenhofer 2010; Stern and Jotzo 2010). As described
above, domestic and international rate-based emission regulations have at-
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tracted the attention of various countries, but insufficient research has been
done on these. Finding the effect of rate-based policies on emissions and GDP
and comparing that with the effect of cap-and-trade policies and rate-based
regulations is important when considering climate change policies.
Examples of theoretical studies of emissions trading under rate-based
regulations include Fischer (2003) and Boom and Dijkstra (2009). Fischer
(2003) proposes the free allocation of emission permits in accordance with
an emission rate. This method enables countries to achieve their emission
rate targets. Henceforth, we call this the rate-based policy method. Fischer
(2003) further shows that the total amount of emissions tends to increase
when the cap-and-trade and rate-based policies are combined than under the
cap-and-trade policy alone. However, it is not enough that we compare the
cap-and-trade and rate-based policies. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) show that
the amount of output is larger under the rate-based policy than under the
cap-and-trade policy in the long term, and, theoretically, even in the short
term. However, the conclusion of this study, obtained on assumptions, is that
of identical emissions levels under both policies, and that it is not possible to
compare the magnitude relationship of emissions by themselves. There are
several studies on the regulation of the emission rate (Pizer 2005; Quirion
2005), but since these studies do not consider emissions trading as a policy.
In this chapter, we compare emissions and output under the cap-and-trade
and rate-based policies by using theoretical models capable of changing the
intensity of emissions in the long run. However, these models are assumed
not to take into account the entry and exit of enterprises. In addition, we
analyze the difference between emissions and output under both policies; for
this, we assume that in the vicinity of the production level of the industry as
a whole, in which each company realizes its profit maximization behavior, the
relationship of output and emissions is a linear approximation expressed as
a linear function. As a result, the rate-based policy tends to show increased
output and emissions by the industry as a whole compared to the cap-and-
trade policy.
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3.2 Theoretical analysis
3.2.1 Model
In this subsection, we present some of our assumptions. First, with x and
e denoting output and emissions, respectively, we assume the following rela-
tionship.
e(x, a) = ax+ b
where a ≥ 0 is the emission intensity representing the emission efficiency of
a company, b > 0 the fixed emissions, and e(x, a) the emission function.
The cost function c(x, a) is a function of output and emission intensity,
with the partial derivatives of each assumed to be cx > 0 and ca ≤ 0. The
second-order partial derivatives are assumed to be cxx > 0, cxa = 0, and
caa ≥ 0. Here, we assume that the marginal cost of production is not affected
by emission intensity, but this assumption seems to slacken when we discuss
the whole industry. In addition, the output price p and factor prices are given.
This means that the company does not have a price control mechanism, and
that the supply of and demand for the production factors are not changed
by changes in emission intensity.
3.2.2 Individual firm level
In this subsection, we compare the output and emissions of a company when
emissions trading is introduced, when cap-and-trade (represented by the sub-
script q) or rate-based (represented by the subscript s) policies are adopted,
and when emissions trading is not introduced and there is no regulation
(represented by the subscript o). Emissions trading represents a perfectly
competitive market with permit price p regardless of whether it is under the
cap-and-trade or rate-based policy. This indicates that the emissions trading
market is not closed in the country. The number of companies in an industry
is N .
In the case of no regulation, the profit function of an industry pio(xo, ao)
can be represented as shown below: The subscript i = 1, . . . , N is omitted
to indicate individual firms.
pio(xo, ao) = pxo − c(xo, ao) (3.1)
29
The profit maximizing conditions of the firm are
∂pio(xo, ao)
∂xo
= p− cx(xo, ao) = 0 (3.2)
∂pio(xo, ao)
∂ao
= −ca(xo, ao) = 0 (3.3)
Here, the cost function that is constantly higher than a∗o holds (3.3), and
it is differentiable on a∗o. We assume this in order to avoid degrading the
technological level.
Next, when we introduce emissions trading under the cap-and-trade pol-
icy, the profit function piq(xq, aq) of the firm is
piq(xq, aq) = pxq − c(xq, aq) + r [e¯− e(xq, aq)] (3.4)
where e¯ denotes the emission permits assigned to the firm and the emis-
sion function is e(xq, aq) = aqxq + b. From (3.4), the profit maximization
conditions are
∂piq(xq, aq)
∂xq
= p− cx(xq, aq)− raq = 0 (3.5)
∂piq(xq, aq)
∂aq
= −ca(xq, aq)− rxq = 0 (3.6)
In addition, when we introduce emissions trading under the rate-based policy,
the profit function pis(xs, as) is
pis(xs, as) = pxs − c(xs, as) + r [a¯xs − e(xs, as)] (3.7)
where a¯ is the emission rate set for the firm and a¯xs is the emission permits
assigned to it. We will discuss how a¯ is determined later. From (3.7), the
profit maximization conditions are
∂pis(xs, as)
∂xs
= p− cx(xs, as) + r(a¯− as) = 0 (3.8)
∂pis(xs, as)
∂as
= −ca(xs, as)− rxs = 0 (3.9)
Next, by comparing the profit maximization conditions derived so far, we
consider the magnitude of the output and emissions relationship in each
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policy. From (3.2) and (3.5), assuming that the output price p is constant,
we obtain
cx(xo, ao) = cx(xq, aq) + raq (3.10)
Since the second term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (3.10) is positive,
the term on the left-hand side (LHS) of the equation should be larger than
the first term on the RHS for the equation to be satisfied. Considering the
assumptions cxx > 0 and cxa = 0, xo > xq. That is, when the cap-and-trade
policy is introduced, the output of the firm decreases.
Combining (3.2) and (3.8), we obtain
cx(xo, ao) = cx(xs, as)− r(a¯− as) (3.11)
Since the relationship between output and emissions is assumed to be linear,
a¯ > as is satisfied. This is because if a¯ > as is not satisfied, it is not possible
to satisfy the rate-based regulation. Thus, the second term on the RHS of
(3.11) is positive, and for the equation to be satisfied, the term on the LHS
of the equation must be smaller than the first term on the RHS. Considering
the assumptions cxx > 0 and cxa = 0, xo < xs. That is, when the rate-based
policy is introduced, the output of the firm increases.
Next, combining (3.3) and (3.6), we obtain
ca(xo, ao) = ca(xq, aq) + rxq (3.12)
Since the second term on the RHS of (3.12) is positive, for the equation to
be satisfied, the term on the LHS of the equation must be larger than the
first term on the RHS. Considering the assumptions caa ≥ 0 and cxa = 0,
a∗o > a
∗
q. That is, when the cap-and-trade policy is introduced, the emission
intensity of the firm increases.
Here, because e(xo, ao) = aoxo + b, e(xq, aq) = aqxq + b and b is constant;
we therefore obtain
e(xo, ao)− aoxo = e(xq, aq)− aqxq (3.13)
From x∗o > x
∗
q and a
∗
o > a
∗
q, the second term on the LHS of (3.13) is greater
than the second term on the RHS. For the equation to be satisfied, the first
term on the LHS of the equation must be larger than the first term on the
RHS. That is, from e(x∗o, a
∗
o) > e(x
∗
q, a
∗
q), when the cap-and-trade policy is
introduced, the emission intensity of the firm decreases.
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Next, from (3.3) and (3.9), we have
ca(xo, ao) = ca(xs, as) + rxs (3.14)
Since the second term of the RHS of (3.14) is positive, the first term on
the LHS of the equation must be larger than the first term on the RHS. Con-
sidering the assumptions caa ≥ 0 and cxa = 0, a∗o > a∗s. That is, when the
rate-based policy is introduced, the emission intensity of the firm decreases.
From our earlier discussions, x∗o < x
∗
s; therefore, when the rate-based policy
is introduced, the emission intensity of the firm improves but the output in-
creases. Thus, it is not clear whether the emission increases can be compared
when there is no restriction. We summarize the results in Table 3.1.
3.2.3 Industry level
In the previous subsection, we analyzed the difference between the cap-and-
trade and rate-based policies at the individual firm level. In this subsection,
we analyze the difference between the two policies at the industry level,
aggregating the individual firms. The assumption of the cost function C
at the industry level is the same as in the previous subsection. First, we
intuitively describe each policy at the industry level from Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 presents a method to determine the level of output X =
N∑
i=1
xi
of the whole industry under the cap-and-trade policy. In the case of output
and emissions with no regulation at point A, the profit is the value at point
A′. Next, when the government sets E¯ =
N∑
i=1
ei as the emissions target,
the output and emission values to maximize profits are at point B and the
profit is the value at point B′. In addition, we assume that the emission
function of small slopes can be realized by changing the emission intensity
through technology changes. The profit that can be achieved under the new
emission intensity regime is the value at point C′. Therefore, this value
is greater than the profit at point B′, and the emission intensity a (note
that this is not the a at the individual firm level) of the entire industry is
subject to change. Moreover, the profit curve is shifted to a lower level and
the profit is reduced. Further, increasing the production level when there
is no regulation also means that the profit is reduced. Therefore, when we
assume that CXa = 0 with respect to the cost function at the industry level,
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introducing the cap-and-trade policy does not lead to the output becoming
excessive.
Figure 3.2 shows a method by which to determine the output and emission
levels of the whole industry under the rate-based policy. As shown earlier,
when the output and emissions realized with no regulation are at point A,
the profit is the value at point A′. Next, when the government sets E¯ as
the emissions target, we assume that the emission rate, such as the emission
intensity, is set under the output at point A. If this does not change the
emission intensity, the output and emission values necessary to maximize the
profit under the rate-based policy are at point D, and the profit is the value
at point D′. If the emission intensity improves through technology changes,
the output and emission values can be obtained at point E and the profit
is the value at point E′. By the profit magnitude relation at points D′ and
E′, we can determine whether the emission intensity changes. Reducing the
output level when there is no restriction means that the profit becomes less.
Therefore, when the profit curve shifts downward, as in the figure, we find
that introducing the rate-based policy does not lead to the output becoming
too small.
In the case of no regulation, the emission intensity of the industry is ao,
and the profit function at the industry level can be shown as
Πo(Xo) = pXo − C(Xo, ao) (3.15)
Therefore, the profit maximization condition is
dΠo(Xo)
dXo
= p− CX(Xo, ao) = 0 (3.16)
Thus,
p = CX(Xo, ao) (3.17)
Next, in the case of introducing emissions trading under the cap-and-
trade policy, the profit function Πq(aq) at the industry level can be written
as shown below in order to constrain E¯ = aqXq + B, where B is defined as
N∑
i=1
bi.
Πq(aq) = pXq − C(Xq, aq)
= p
E¯ − b
aq
− C
(
E¯ − b
aq
, aq
)
(3.18)
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Since the emission function is a linear equation, the emission intensity at the
industry level can be determined by the amount of output. From this, since
the profit function can be written as an emission intensity function, the profit
maximization condition is
dΠq(aq)
daq
= −pE¯ −B
(aq)
2 + CX(Xq, aq)
E¯ −B
(aq)
2 − Ca(Xq, aq) = 0
Thus,
p = CX(Xq, aq)− aq
Xq
Ca(Xq, aq) (3.19)
Then, when emission trading is introduced under the cap-and-trade pol-
icy, to satisfy the emission target, we impose the following restriction:{
Es = asXs +B
Es = a¯Xs
From this, the restriction becomes
Xs =
B
a¯− as (3.20)
Since the industry as a whole is subject to constraint (3.20), the profit func-
tion Πs(as) can be denoted as
Πs(as) = pXs − C(Xs, as)
= p
B
a¯− as − C
(
B
a¯− as , as
)
(3.21)
From (3.21), the profit maximization condition is
dΠs(as)
das
= p
B
(a¯− as)2
− CX(Xs, as) B
(a¯− as)2
− Ca(Xs, as) = 0
Thus,
p = CX(Xs, as) +
a¯− as
Xs
Ca(Xs, as) (3.22)
Next, when we assume that CXa < 0, CXa = 0, and CXa > 0, by compar-
ing the profit maximization conditions obtained, we can consider the output
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and emissions magnitude relation under each policy. First, we compare the
output and emissions with no regulation under the cap-and-trade policy.
When we compare (3.17) and (3.19), since the output price is assumed to be
constant, the following equation is satisfied.
CX(Xo, ao) = CX(Xq, aq)− aq
Xq
Ca(Xq, aq) (3.23)
■ CXa < 0
Since the second term on the RHS of (3.23) is positive, ao > aq, and
CXa < 0, the term on the LHS of the equation, is smaller than the first
term on the RHS. To satisfy the equation, from the assumption that
CXX > 0, it is necessary that X
∗
o > X
∗
q be satisfied. That is, when the
cap-and-trade policy is introduced, the total output decreases.
■ CXa = 0
Since the second term on the RHS of (3.23) is positive, to satisfy the
equation, it is necessary that the term on the LHS of the equation be
larger than the first term on the RHS. Furthermore, from the assump-
tion that CXa = 0, X
∗
o > X
∗
q . That is, when the cap-and-trade policy
is introduced, the total output decreases.
■ CXa > 0
Since the second term on the RHS of (3.23) is positive, ao > aq, and
CXa < 0, the term on the LHS of the equation, is smaller than the first
term on the RHS. However, the magnitude relation of X∗o and X
∗
q is
ambiguous.
Next, we compare the output and emissions under no regulation and the
rate-based policy. From (3.17) and (3.22), we obtain
CX(Xo, ao) = CX(Xs, as) +
a¯− as
Xs
Ca(Xs, as) (3.24)
■ CXa < 0
Since a¯ > as and Ca < 0, the second term on the RHS of (3.24) is
negative. Furthermore, since ao > as and CXa < 0, the term on the
LHS of the equation is smaller than the first term on the RHS. In this
case, the magnitude relation of X∗o and X
∗
s is ambiguous.
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■ CXa = 0
Since the second term on the RHS of (3.24) is negative, to satisfy the
equation, it is necessary that the term on the LHS of the equation
be smaller than the first term on the RHS. From the assumption that
CXa = 0, X
∗
o < X
∗
s . That is, when the rate-based policy is introduced,
the total output increases.
■ CXa > 0
Since the second term on the RHS of (3.24) is negative, ao > as, and
CXa > 0, the term on the LHS of the equation, is larger than the first
term on the RHS. To satisfy the equation, from the assumption that
CXX > 0, it is necessary that X
∗
o < X
∗
s be satisfied. That is, when the
rate-based policy is introduced, the total output increases.
We summarize the above results in Table 3.2. It is natural for the emis-
sions target of the government to be realized under the cap-and-trade policy.
In Table 3.2, the emissions shown under the rate-based policy give the emis-
sions realized when the emissions rate is set by the government to satisfy
a˜ = E¯
X∗o
. a˜ is the ratio of emissions to output under no regulation. Even
under the rate-based policy, the government can help achieve the emissions
target a¯ by choosing the appropriate emissions rate E¯. However, in order
to set the optimum emission rate, the government should know the firms’
marginal cost of emission intensity. Since it is expensive to obtain such
information, we set this to a˜ = E¯
X∗o
, the emission rate established by the
government.
Thus, when the emission rate is set to satisfy a˜, the emission target is
greater than E¯. This is because it can be said that E˜s = a˜X
∗
s =
E¯
X∗o
·X∗s =
E¯ · X∗s
X∗o
and X∗o < X
∗
s . Further, the assumption that CXa < 0 is based
on the cost function; thus the marginal cost of production increases when
improving the emission intensity. Further, from (3.17) and CXX > 0, the
marginal cost of production increases by improving the emission intensity.
Thus, the vertex of the profit curve moves lower and leftward in Figures 3.1
and 3.2. Therefore, under the rate-based policy, by increasing the output,
we cannot ultimately conclude whether to increase or decrease the output.
Neither can we conclude whether to increase or decrease the emissions to be
achieved. Similarly, when the cost function is CXa > 0, for the same reason,
we cannot conclude whether to increase or decrease the output under the
cap-and-trade policy.
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3.3 Simulation
The emission rate shown in Table 3.2 is set by the government in a relatively
simple manner. However, this is one of the emission rate-setting methods.
In this section, we simulate how the total emissions change when the settings
of the emission rate are changed. In addition, we examine the efficiency of
each policy and compare the total profits realized at the industry level under
the cap-and-trade and rate-based policies.
3.3.1 Relationship between emission rate settings and
emissions
To satisfy the assumptions made so far, we consider the cost function as
C(X, a) = X2+ a2− 2a+2, where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, the output price as p = 1, and
the fixed emissions level as B = 1. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between
the emission rate a¯ and emissions E.
Under the parameters identified, the optimal emissions level is E∗o = 1.5
and the optimal emission rate is a∗o =
E∗o
x∗o
= 3 with no regulation. From
Figure 3.3, we find that the emissions level can be larger than that with no
regulation depending on the emission rate set by the government. However,
by lowering the emission rate set, the emissions level can be made smaller
than in the case of no regulation. However, Figure 3.3 shows that unless the
rate is set to levels that are half the emission rate under no restrictions, this
does not lead to the desired result. The advantage of the emissions trading
scheme is that the emissions target is likely to be achieved. However, when
introducing emissions trading under the rate-based policy, the policy should
carefully consider the influence of total emissions.
3.3.2 Comparison of efficiency between cap-and-trade
policy and rate-based policy
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between emissions and profits under the
cap-and-trade and rate-based policies. In this subsection, we show that the
cost function is C(X, a) = X2 + a2 − 2a + 2, where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, the output
price is p = 4, and the fixed emissions level is B = 1. In the case of no
regulation, the optimal emissions level is E∗o = 3 and that of profits is pi
∗
o = 3.
Figure 3.4 shows the profit levels under emissions trading with a variety of
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emission targets under the cap-and-trade and rate-based policies. From this
figure, when we estimate the results to obtain the same emission levels, the
rate-based policy shows lower profits compared to the cap-and-trade policy.
Because the rate-based policy has a more constrained setup than the cap-
and-trade policy, the efficiency of the policy is naturally reduced.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we compared the cap-and-trade and rate-based policies in
emissions trading. Under the assumption of a linear relationship between
output and emissions, we showed that output and emissions at the industry
level tend to decrease under the cap-and-trade policy, and tend to increase
under the rate-based policy. In addition, using numerical simulations, we
analyzed the changes in emissions and profits when the settings of the emis-
sion rate are changed. When trying to achieve the same emissions target, we
found that the profit under the rate-based policy is less than that under the
cap-and-trade policy; in other words, efficiency under the rate-based policy
is low.
Even under the rate-based policy, by setting the emission rate very low,
it is possible to achieve emissions that are lower than in the case of no reg-
ulation. However, setting the emissions intensity level very low can lead
to difficulties. This is because under rate-based regulation, there could be
resistance to constraints on economic activities that could be considered bur-
densome to the industrial sector.
In the next chapter, we simulate a CGE analysis based on the model
of this chapter. However, the parameters in Chapter Four do not seem to
represent the technological level explicitly, unlike in this chapter, and since
the parameters in the CES function represent the technological level, the
conclusions of this chapter cannot be shown directly in the next chapter.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of emissions and output at the individual firm level
Output Emission intensity Emissions
Cap-and-trade policy − − −
Rate-based policy + − ambiguous
Note: The signs indicate a comparison with no regulation.
Table 3.2: Comparison of emissions and output at the industry level
Assumption CXa < 0 CXa = 0 CXa > 0
Output Emissions Output Emissions Output Emissions
Cap-and-trade − E¯ − E¯ ? E¯
Rate-based ? ? + E˜s > E¯ ＋ E˜s > E¯
Notes: The signs indicate a comparison with no regulation. E˜s is the emission level to be
achieved when the rate-based policy is introduced, and the emissions rate is set to
divide the government’s emissions target E¯ by the amount of output with no regulation.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of cap-and-trade policy
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Chapter 4
Introduction of rate-based
policy in Japan: A CGE
analysis
4.1 Introduction
Although global efforts toward climate change mitigation have tended to
focus on total emission amounts, some countries have set emission targets
relative to their GDP. For example, China and India, which are likely to be
major arbiters of global climate change in the next century, have set such
targets. The Chinese government seeks to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
as a proportion of GDP in 2020 by 40–45% compared to the 2005 proportion.
India has a similar policy to decrease its carbon intensity in 2020 by 20–25%
compared to that in 2005.
The effects on carbon emissions of linking emissions to GDP values (herein
referred to as the emission rate) cannot be determined, as revealed in Fisher
(2003) and Boom and Dijkstra (2009). These theoretical studies investigate
the effects of a rate-based policy that aims to attain a particular emission
rate under the emissions trading scheme. Fischer (2003) shows that the total
amount of emissions tends to increase with the rate-based policy compared
to the case where a cap-and-trade policy and the rate-based policy are used
together. Boom and Dijkstra (2009) show that the amount of output in the
rate-based policy increases compared to that in the cap-and-trade policy in
the short term and long term. While these studies suggest that a rate-based
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policy cannot restrict total emissions and does not suppress economic growth,
the extent of such a policy’s impact has not been scrutinized empirically and
quantitatively.
This study investigates the impact of a rate-based policy in Japan us-
ing computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis. While Japan’s target
for greenhouse gas emissions are based on the total emission amount, intro-
ducing a rate-based target similar to those of China and India is a topic of
discussion. As it allows an increase in production, the introduction of a rate-
based policy is preferred by industries and trade unions likely to be affected
by the government’s climate policy. A report by the Japanese Ministry of
the Environment on the introduction of the domestic cap-and-trade policy
also included to the possibility of introducing a rate-based policy (Japanese
Ministry of the Environment 2010).
The results of this study suggest that within the framework of the CGE
analysis, the rate-based policy can reduce firms’ emissions at a greater emis-
sion rate than that specified by regulation in the short run. However, in the
long run we show that because of the effects of technological progress and
capital accumulation, there is a possibility that with the introduction of the
rate-based policy, emission and production may increase compared to the
case with no regulations. In addition, we show that the rate-based policy
tends to reduce the rate of production more evenly across sectors. In con-
trast, the cap-and-trade policy can increase the output of sectors that emit
less carbon dioxide and thereby promote a structural shift in the economy.
The remaider of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 intro-
duces the model. Section 4.3 explains the data used and the method of
calibration. Section 4.4 presents simulation results for the assumption that
the rate-based policy is introduced to attain a 25% reduction in the emission
rate from that in the base case and compares the rate-based policy and the
cap-and-trade-policy using the static model. Section 4.5 examines the effect
of the rate-based policy in the long-run on output and emissions by using
dynamic CGE analysis. Section 4.6 presents our concluding remarks.
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4.2 Model
4.2.1 Static model
We develop a static CGE model for the Japanese economy based on 2005
data. The model is composed of 34 sectors, which are listed in Table 4.1.
It is assumed that three sectors—crude petroleum, coking coal, and nat-
ural gas (foss), petroleum and coal products (p c) and gas and heat sup-
ply (ghs)—produce energy goods and that other sectors produce non-energy
goods. Firms emit carbon dioxide from their production process as they use
energy goods, while households emit carbon dioxide from their consumption
of energy goods.
The model has three economic agents: a household, firms and the gov-
ernment. In this analysis, a representative household that owns exogenously
given capital and labor is assumed. The household provides capital and la-
bor to firms and, using the income obtained, it saves money and purchases
goods. It saves at a constant rate and gains utility from the consumption of
goods.
Figure 4.1 shows that the household gains utility from the consumption
of energy and non-energy goods. The number in Figure 4.1 denotes the
elasticity of substitution, which is assumed to equal 1. The household deter-
mines its consumption of goods so as to maximize its utility under budget
constraints.
Figure 4.2 shows the production structure of firms. A firm produces
a primary production factor by using capital and labor, then produces a
secondary production factor by using energy goods, and finally produces a
final product by using non-energy goods. It is assumed that carbon dioxide
emissions occur because of the use of energy goods. To maximize profits,
firms determine the production quantity in this production structure.
Then, the final products are transformed into domestic goods and ex-
port goods. The domestic goods are transformed into Armington composite
goods in combination with imported goods (Takeda 2007). The assumption
about imperfect substitution between imported and domestic goods is called
Armington’s assumption (Armington 1969). The elasticity of substitution
between domestic goods and imported goods and the elasticity of transfor-
mation between domestic goods and export goods are set at 4. The value of
the elasticity of substitution in our model comes from the reference value in
Takeda (2007).
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In addition, the government is supposed to collect three types of tax:
production tax, tariff, and tax on household income. It is assumed that the
government consumes or saves the tax revenue at a constant rate.
For simplicity, a small country is assumed. As a result, the foreign cur-
rency prices of imported and exported goods are constant. As for the balance
of payments, the amount of the current account imbalance is constant. In
addition, the current account deficit is interpreted as foreign savings.
From the above settings, government spending, household consumption,
and the current account deficit are determined, and as a result, the total
amount of savings is determined. The total amount of savings is spent on
investment goods at a constant rate.
4.2.2 Dynamic model
In this paper, we use a recursive dynamic model. Each economic agency op-
timizes its behavior in each period and does not foresee events such as policy
changes. Therefore, they would not decide their behavior in the current time
period according expectations of future events. While the basic structure of
the dynamic model is the same as that of the static model, we add a capital
accumulation term:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + θIt
whereKt+1 is capital accumulation in period t+1, δ is the depreciation rate of
capital, and It is investment in period t. Here, θ is a parameter for adjusting
the divergence of the capital accumulation so that Kt matches the actual
amounts of capital accumulation listed in the input-output tables. There
are several reasons for such adjustments. Capital in this study is obtained
by summing the capital consumption allowances and operating surplus in
the input–output tables. However, it merely represents the rental cost of
capital in one year, so this amount is undervalued compared to the actual
capital accumulation. For these reasons, it is necessary to use θ in the CGE
model. By dividing the amount of capital accumulation in the input–output
table by the real amount, we can calculate θ and match the scale. We use a
depreciation rate of 0.064, which was estimated by Takeda (2007).
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4.3 Data and calibration
In CGE analysis, data are taken from a base year and a simulation is per-
formed using these benchmark data. The benchmark data are made up of
economic data and emissions data.
In the present study, the data comprise economic data and emissions
data. The economic data comprise data on intermediate inputs, final con-
sumption, investment, government expenditure, and exports and imports
taken from 2005 Input–output Tables for Japan (Statistics Bureau, Japanese
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2009). In addition, we use
data on government savings from Income and Outlay Accounts Classified by
Institutional Sector in 2005 (Economic and Social Research Institute 2007).
We construct a social accounting matrix from these data for the CGE anal-
ysis. Emissions data are taken from the consumption and input of energy
goods from the 3EID database (Nansai et al. 2012).
In addition, three data sets are used in the model: the capital accumula-
tion amount in 2005, the real GDP as a target for 2020, and carbon dioxide
emissions in 2020 under the business-as-usual (BaU) scenario.
The value of the capital accumulation in 2005 was 1,446 trillion yen (RI-
ETI 2012). This value is used to determine theta.
The real GDP and carbon dioxide emissions in 2020 under the BaU sce-
nario are used to derive the path of the benchmark in the dynamic model.
We adjust the rates of technological progress and population growth so as
to attain the real GDP and carbon dioxide emissions in 2020. This will be
described in more detail in the next section. The data for the real GDP in
2020 were obtained from the annual GDP (ESRI 2013). We use a 2% real
GDP growth rate averaged through to 2020, which the Abe administration
has set as a growth strategy. The amount of the real GDP in 2020 is 608.9
trillion yen. In addition, we assume carbon dioxide emissions under the BaU
scenario in 2020 to be 1,076 million tons (Ban 2013).
In a CGE analysis, calibration refers to a model estimation method that
exactly reproduces the initial equilibrium of the estimated model. From the
social accounting matrix, we can obtain the parameters for the production
function, utility function, saving rate, tax rate, income, and emissions coef-
ficient.
As data in the social accounting matrix are only expressed in terms of
the value added, we must separate the value data into quantity and price
data. For convenience, it is assumed that labor is the numeraire good, and
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the price for all production factors and all products take a value of one in the
base year. Numerical computation is done with GAMS (General Algebraic
Modeling System) and its solver, PATH.
4.4 Static CGE analysis
4.4.1 Impacts of rate-based policy
Using the CGE model, we analyze the characteristics of emission regulations
with the rate-based policy. When emissions trading under the rate-based
policy is introduced, the profit function of the representative firm in the
sector is represented as follows:
max
y1,y2
Pxx− {Py1y1 + Py2y2 + PCO2(hy2y2 − αx)} (4.1)
where x is the output, y1 is the input of non-energy goods, y2 is the input of
energy goods, hy2 is the emission coefficient, and α is the emission rate. Px,
Py1 , Py2 , and PCO2 represent the prices of x, y1, y2, and emission permits,
respectively. We assume that emission regulations are imposed only on firms
and not on the household. A firm’s carbon dioxide emissions are represented
by hy2y2, while αx denotes the initially allocated emission permits. When the
amount of emissions is larger than that allowed under the allocated emission
permits (hy2y2−αx > 0), the firm must be a buyer of permits at the permit
price PCO2 . In contrast, when the amount of emissions is smaller than the
allocated emission permits (hy2y2 − αx < 0), the firm must be a seller of
permits. Under the rate-based policy, the price of permits is determined by
the demand and supply for emission permits as follows:∑
i
hy2iyy2i =
∑
i
αixi (4.2)
where i is the index of the firm. The LHS of (4.2) denotes the total demand
for emission permits and the RHS denotes the total supply. PCO2 is deter-
mined so as to satisfy this equation. In the rate-based policy simulation,
the business-as-usual (BaU) emission rate is calculated by dividing the BaU
emissions by the BaU output. A rate-based policy is expressed by multi-
plying the BaU emission rate by an amount less than one. For example, a
rate-based policy that requires a 10% reduction in the emission rate is ex-
pressed by multiplying the BaU emission rate by 0.9. This means that the
47
firm must reduce emissions by 10% from the BaU emissions when it maintains
its output at the BaU level.
Table 4.2 shows the results of a simulation for a 25% reduction in the
emission rate. Note that the policy requires a 25% reduction from the BaU
emission rate. Since the BaU data are for the Japanese economy in 2005, the
policy refers to emissions and output in 2005. After a 25% reduction in the
emission rate, emissions from firms are reduced by more than 25%, with the
actual value being −26.6%. Because the rate-based policy in this simulation
is imposed only on firms, the emission reduction from the household is small,
0.59%. As a result, the total emission of carbon dioxide is reduced by 22.9%.
The total supply of emission permits is
∑
i
αixi. By requiring αi to be
reduced by 25%, the output also becomes less than the BaU output, and
emissions are reduced by 26.6%—that is, at a rate greater than that required
by the rate-based policy. Even though the rate-based policy seems to allow
firms to increase emissions and output, such increases are not possible in the
short run. Because capital and labor are limited, the economy does not grow
beyond the BaU. Thus, emissions from firms are reduced by 26.6%—that is,
at a rate greater than the emission rate (25%) required by the rate-based
policy in this analysis.
The impact of requiring a lower emission rate on carbon dioxide emissions
and on the permit price are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. By
requiring a lower emission rate, emissions are reduced and the permit price
increases because of an increase in the marginal abatement cost.
Figure 4.5 shows the realized emission rate in each sector after a 25%
reduction in the emission rate. Although the reduction in the total emission
rate is 25%, such reduction varies across sectors. This rate is significantly
reduced in sectors such as pulp, paper, and wood products (pulp), ceramic,
stone, and clay products (nmm), and iron and steel (iron). This suggests
that the marginal cost of reducing the emission rate is relatively lower in
these sectors.
4.4.2 Comparison of cap-and-trade policy and rate-
based policy
In this section, we compare the rate-based policy with the cap-and-trade
policy, assuming that both policies reduce the total amount of emission by
25% from the 1990 levels. The policy settings in this section differ from those
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in the previous section. The reference year of policies examined in this section
is 1990, while that in the previous section is 2005. Policies in this section
target the total amount of emission, while that in the previous section focus
on firms’ emissions. However, as before, we assume that emission regulations
are imposed only on firms and not on the household in both policies.
When emissions trading using the cap-and-trade policy is introduced, the
profit function of the firm is represented as follows:
max
x
Pxx− (Py1y1 + Py2y2 + PCO2hy2y2) (4.3)
We assume that emission permits are auctioned by the government and that
the household receives the auction revenue. Under the cap-and-trade policy,
the permit price PCO2 is determined by the demand and supply of emission
permits using the following equation:∑
i
hy2iy2i = E¯ (4.4)
where E¯ is the total supply of permits offered by the government. The LHS
of (4.4) denotes the total demand for emission permits and the RHS denotes
its total supply. PCO2 is determined according to this equation.
Table 4.3 shows the results. As shown in this table, in order to achieve
the same target of total emissions, the real GDP under the rate-based policy
is lower than that under the cap-and-trade policy. This means that the rate-
based policy is inefficient. The permit price and the marginal abatement cost
are higher under the rate-based policy than under the cap-and-trade policy.
Although the target in this section is the reduction of total emissions, the
rate-based policy focuses on the emission rate. Since the rate-based policy
is a mixture of policies on emissions and output, it induces an inefficient
allocation of resources to attain the total emission target.
The reduction of emissions by 25% compared to 1990 levels means a re-
duction of 28.8% compared to 2005 emission levels. That is, total emissions
from firms and the household are regulated to be 28.8% lower than the 2005
levels. Emissions from firms are reduced by 32.9% with the cap-and-trade
policy and by 33.4% with the rate-based policy. Emissions from the house-
hold are reduced by 4.6% with the cap-and-trade policy and by 1.1% with the
rate-based policy. Although the household is not required to reduce emis-
sions, its emissions decrease because its consumption decreases because of
the reduction of the output of firms.
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Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the changes in output for each sector under
the cap-and-trade policy and the rate-based policy, respectively. Under both
policies, the output of the three sectors that produce energy goods, crude
petroleum, coking coal and natural gas (foss), petroleum and coal products
(p c) and gas and heat supply (ghs), are significantly and negatively affected.
In contrast, the output of iron and steel (iron) and electricity (ely) are re-
duced significantly with the cap-and-trade policy, whereas they are reduced
to a lesser extent with the rate-based policy. Under the rate-based policy,
large sectors such as iron and steel and electricity can obtain many permits
free of charge from the government according to their BaU emission rate, and
hence, the drop in their output is small. In this way, industry must reduce
output under the cap-and-trade policy, but it does not significantly reduce
output under the rate-based policy.
Reductions in output are more evenly distributed among sectors with the
rate-based policy than with the cap-and-trade policy. Comparing Figures 4.6
and 4.7, it is apparent that the decrease in output with the rate-based policy
is smaller than that with the cap-and-trade policy. This can be understood
by arranging equation 4.1 as follows:
max
x
(Px + αPCO2)x− (Py1y1 + Py2y2 + PCO2hy2y2). (4.5)
Since αPCO2 in the first term of equation (4.5) is positive, the rate-based
policy has the features of a subsidy for output while imposing a tax on
emissions. For this reason, the reduction rate of output under the rate-based
policy can be smaller in many sectors than that under the cap-and-trade
policy.
In three sectors, information and communication electronics equipment
(iteq), electronic components (semi), and precision instruments (preq), out-
put increases under the cap-and-trade policy but decreases under the rate-
based policy. Carbon dioxide emissions from these sectors are very small.
Of the total emissions in Japan in 2005, the share of iteq is 0.03%, semi
is 0.25%, and preq is 0.03%. Therefore, with the introduction of the cap-
and-trade policy, demand for these products increases. This suggests the
possibility of changes in the industrial structure toward a low-carbon econ-
omy. The cap-and-trade policy can promote growth in sectors related to
information technology while the rate-based policy does not have such an
effect.
We summarize our results as follows. The decrease in output tends to
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be more evenly distributed under the rate-based policy than under the cap-
and-trade policy. Regarding the sectors with lower carbon dioxide emission
(iteq, semi, and preq), output increases with the cap-and-trade policy but
decreases with the rate-based policy. Since the rate-based policy aims to
reduce emissions by setting the emission rate, it is thus inefficient in reducing
emissions. As a result, the real GDP under the rate-based policy is smaller
than that under the cap-and-trade policy.
4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We conduct a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the results. We
change the elasticity of substitution σE = 0.5 in the input of energy goods
to σE = 0.3 or 0.7 and analyze the change in the static analysis results.
Table 4.4 shows the result in the case of a 25% reduction of the emission
rate. From this table, we can see that emissions fall by more than 25%
regardless of the value of σE. Thus, the results in Section 4 are robust to a
change in the elasticity of substitution. When the elasticity of substitution
σE is large, the real GDP is large and the emission reduction is small. This
is because production efficiency increases.
Table 4.5 shows the comparison of the cap-and-trade policy and the rate-
based policy when σE changes. From Table 4.5, we note that the reduction
in the real GDP under the rate-based policy is higher than that under the
cap-and-trade policy regardless of the value of σE. Thus, this result is the
same as that in Section 4.5. Further, when σE is large, the real GDP becomes
larger. This is the same result as that in Table 4.4. The lower permit price
indicates that the marginal abatement cost is lower because of the increase
in production efficiency. The permit price changes significantly according to
σE, suggesting that technological change would have a significant impact on
the cost of climate change mitigation.
4.5 Dynamic CGE analysis
4.5.1 Business as usual
In this subsection, we develop a recursive dynamic model without emission
regulation (BaU scenario). First, we determine the real GDP and emissions
in 2020 in the BaU scenario.
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The real GDP of the BaU in 2020 is calculated as follows. By using the
real GDP in 2012 obtained from the ESRI (2013) and the “growth strategy”
of the Abe administration in Japan, the real GDP in 2020 is calculated such
that the average real GDP growth rate is 2% up to 2020. As a result, the
real GDP in 2020 is estimated as 608.9 million yen.
A figure of 1,076 million tons of CO2 emissions in 2020 under the BaU
scenario is sourced from Ban (2012). A model is created so that these val-
ues are realized in 2020. In CGE analysis, it is assumed that technological
progress includes increases in labor productivity and the input efficiency of
energy goods, and we create a dynamic model to fit the BaU scenario (Ja-
coby et al. 2004; Sue Wing 2010). Therefore, the rate of increase in labor
productivity λL and the parameter ϕ that relates to the input efficiency of
energy goods are introduced into the model.
By expressing labor productivity as an increase in the endowment of labor
Lt, we can formulate the following:
Lt+1 = (1 + λL)Lt
Moreover, the input efficiency of energy goods is included in the production
function as follows:
x = a
[
β1y
σ−1
σ
1 + β2(ϕy2)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
where a, β1, and β2 are the parameters in the CES production function, y1
is the input of non-energy goods, y2 is the input of energy goods, and σ is
the elasticity of substitution. ϕ changes according to the following equation:
ϕt+T = (1 + λE)
Tϕt
where ϕt is ϕ in year 2005 and it is assumed that ϕt = 1. Then, after T
years it is ϕt+T . In this way, we derive Figure 4.8, which shows that the real
GDP is 608.9 trillion yen and emissions are 1,076 million tons of CO2 in 2020
when λL is 0.24% and λE is 4.6%.
4.5.2 Comparison of cap-and-trade policy and rate-
based policy
In this subsection, we compare emissions trading under the cap-and-trade
policy and under the rate-based policy using the dynamic model developed
in the previous subsection. The steps of the analysis are as follows:
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Step 1 Under the cap-and-trade policy, we calculate the reduction rate of emis-
sion allowances to achieve the 25% emissions reduction from 1990 levels
in 2020.
Step 2 Under the rate based policy, the reduction rate obtained in Step 1 is
used as the reduction rate of the emission rate for each sector.
Step 3 We compare the emissions, permit price and real GDP attained under
both policies.
In Step 1, it is calculated that the reduction rate of emissions should be
34.8% compared to 2005 in order to achieve the 25% emissions reduction
from 1990 levels in 2020. It is assumed that the emission reduction in each
year is the same. This value is higher than 25% because the emission target
aims to reduce total emissions including emissions from households, while the
regulation is applied only to firms. In Step 2, each sector applies the value
obtained in Step 1, 34.8%, to the decrease in the emission rate in 2020. It is
assumed that the reduction of the emission rate in each year is the same. In
other words, the emission rate of each sector is reduced by 34.8% compared
to 2005. We show the transition of emissions, permit price and real GDP
from 2005 to 2020 in Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11, respectively.
Figure 4.9 shows that it is possible to achieve the goal of a 25% reduction
from 1990 levels in 2020 under the cap-and-trade policy, but it is difficult to
attain this under the rate-based policy. Under the rate-based policy, emis-
sions are reduced more than in the BaU scenario but not as much as under
the cap-and-trade policy. Figure 4.10 suggests that the permit price is low
under the rate-based policy, since the incentive to reduce emissions is weak
and the demand for permits is low. Figure 4.11 suggests that the rate-based
policy does not reduce the real GDP greatly. On the other hand, the real
GDP falls significantly under the cap-and-trade policy. This is considered
to be the reason for the belief that rate-based regulation does not suppress
economic growth.
4.5.3 Effects of technological progress in rate-based
policy
In the previous subsection, we did not consider technological progress in the
BaU scenario. In this subsection, we suppose that technological progress
follows from environmental regulations. This means that we consider the
53
introduction of the rate-based policy to induce the improvement of labor
productivity or input efficiency.
Under the BaU scenario, the rate of increase in labor productivity λL is
set to 0.24% per year, and the parameter λE relating to the input efficiency
of energy goods is set to 4.6%. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show that varying λL
and λE under the rate-based policy leads to different emissions paths.
In Figure 4.12, we exogenously change the rate of technological progress
in labor productivity from 0.24% to 2%. When labor productivity increases,
the production cost decreases and output increases. As a result, emissions
increase, and therefore the graph shows an upward trend. When λL is more
than 0.53% in spite of the introduction of the rate-based policy, emissions
increase more than in the BaU scenario. This feature is not seen under
the cap-and-trade policy. Under the cap-and-trade policy, even if similar
technological progress occurs, a 25% emission reduction is realized because
a cap is put on total emissions.
In Figure 4.13, we analyzed the case where the parameter for the input
efficiency of energy goods was increased from 4.6% to 20%. As this parameter
is increased, it becomes increasingly possible to produce more goods from less
energy. Therefore, the increase of λE decreases emissions. When λE is more
than 8.7%, a 25% emission reduction can be achieved. Improvement in λL
and in λE have different effects on emissions under the rate-based policy: the
former increases emissions, while the latter reduces emissions.
4.6 Conclusion
This study simulated the introduction of emissions trading in Japan by the
rate-based policy. In the static CGE analysis, it is shown that emissions
from firms are reduced by 25% or more when the emission rate is required to
be reduced by 25% from the base year. This result is explained by the fact
that the reduction of the emission rate and output occur simultaneously. In
the short run, technological innovation is not considered and the emission
reduction effect is large.
Furthermore, we compared the rate-based policy with the cap-and-trade
policy assuming identical levels of emissions reduction. The result suggests
that the rate-based policy reduces the real GDP to a greater extent than the
cap-and-trade policy. This is because the rate-based policy forces a reduction
in emissions even in the high marginal abatement cost sector.
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The rate-based policy does not promote a reduction in emissions for sec-
tors with a higher BaU emission rate even though these sectors are large
and have a relatively low marginal abatement cost. In contrast, the cap-and-
trade policy forces a significant emission reduction for sectors that have a
low marginal abatement cost. Our results suggest that the rate-based policy
is inferior in terms of efficiency, but is favorable in terms of ensuring that the
burden of emission reduction is shared equally among sectors.
When considering capital accumulation, technological progress (e.g., the
improvement of labor productivity and the input efficiency of energy goods),
output and emissions can increase since the rate-based policy does not restrict
total emissions. In this paper, we found that there is a possibility that
emissions would increase with the introduction of the rate-based policy even
if the rate of increase of labor productivity is set at a relatively low level.
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Table 4.1: Sector identifiers (34 sectors)
Identifier Sector description
agr Agriculture, forestry, and fishery
foss Crude petroleum, coking coal, and natural gas*
omn Other mining
food Beverages and foods
tex Textile products
pulp Pulp, paper, and wooden products
chem Chemical products
p c Petroleum and coal products*
nmm Ceramic, stone and clay products
iron Iron and steel
nfm Non-ferrous metals
fmp Metal products
mch General machinery
eleq Electrical products
iteq Information and communication electronic equipment
semi Electronic components
treq Transportation equipment
preq Precision instruments
omf Other industrial products
cns Construction
ely Electricity
ghs Gas and heat supply*
wat Water supply and waste disposal services
trd Commerce
fin Finance and insurance
dwe Real estate
trp Transport
itc Information and communications
pubs Public administration
edu Education and research
mhs Medical service, health, social security, and nursing care
opub Other public services
bsrv Business services
psrv Personal services
Note: * indicates energy goods.
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Table 4.2: Emissions with a −25% emission rate
Total CO2 Emissions (firm) Emissions (household) Permit price Real GDP
−22.9% −26.6% −0.59% 1,327 yen −0.45%
Note: Comparison with the actual 2005 values.
Table 4.3: Comparison of cap-and-trade policy and rate-based policy
Emissions (firm) Emissions (household) Permit price Real GDP
Cap-and-trade −32.9% −4.6% 1,434 yen −0.64%
Rate-based −33.4% −1.1% 2,096 yen −0.74%
Note: Real GDP indicates the change from that under the BaU.
Table 4.4: Sensitivity analysis: −25% emission rate
Elasticity of substitution σE = 0.3 σE = 0.5 σE = 0.7
Emissions (firm) −27.6% −26.6% −26.3%
Real GDP −0.84% −0.45% −0.34%
Note: Comparison with the actual 2005 values.
Table 4.5: Sensitivity analysis: comparison of policies
Cap-and-trade policy Rate-based policy
σE = 0.3 σE = 0.5 σE = 0.7 σE = 0.3 σE = 0.5 σE = 0.7
Real GDP −0.89% −0.64% −0.52% −1.35% −0.74% −0.54%
Permit price 2,659 yen 1,434 yen 943 yen 6,020 yen 2,096 yen 1,202 yen
Note: Real GDP indicates the change from that under the BaU.
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Figure 4.1: Consumption structure
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Figure 4.2: Production structure
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Figure 4.3: Changes in emission rate and CO2 emissions
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Figure 4.4: Changes in emission rate and permit price
59
-50
-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
ag
r
fo
ss
o
m
n
fo
o
d
te
x
p
u
lp
ch
em p
_
c
n
m
m
ir
o
n
n
fm
fm
p
m
ch
el
eq
it
eq
se
m
i
tr
eq
p
re
q
o
m
f
cn
s
el
y
g
h
s
w
at tr
d
fi
n
d
w
e
tr
p
it
c
p
u
b
s
ed
u
m
h
s
o
p
u
b
b
sr
v
p
sr
v
C
h
an
g
e 
in
 e
m
is
si
o
n
 r
at
e 
(%
)
Figure 4.5: Changes in realized emission rates (−25% emission rate)
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Figure 4.6: Changes in output under cap-and-trade policy (−25% total emis-
sions)
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Figure 4.7: Changes in output under rate-based policy (−25% total emis-
sions)
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Figure 4.8: The real GDP and CO2 emissions in BaU
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of CO2 emissions between cap-and-trade policy and
rate-based policy
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of permit price between cap-and-trade policy and
rate-based policy
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of the real GDP between cap-and-trade policy and
rate-based policy
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Figure 4.12: Effects of technological progress on labor productivity (rate-
based policy)
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policy)
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In Chapter Two, we investigated the cost incurred when an incorrect target
is set for direct rate-based regulation. An incorrect target is considered to
be anything other than the optimal emission rate. First, we estimated the
marginal abatement cost function for four industries, iron and steel; chemical;
ceramic, stone, and clay; and pulp and paper, which account for most of
the carbon dioxide emissions in Japan. Using the marginal abatement cost
function that we obtained, we analyzed the introduction of emissions trading
using the cap-and-trade policy in these industries. In addition, we calculated
the emission rate as the ratio of emissions to the value added of each industry.
When the government can directly regulate such emission rates, it is possible
to achieve optimal resource allocation so that marginal abatement costs are
equalized. However, in practice, it would be difficult for the government to
accurately estimate the marginal abatement cost of each industry. Therefore,
we analyzed cases in which the government sets the wrong emission rate to
determine how much loss would occur for these four industries. Throughout
Chapter Two, we noted that there is a possibility of generating additional
costs using direct rate-based regulation.
In Chapter Three, we compared the cap-and-trade policy with the rate-
based policy for emissions trading. Under the assumption that there is a
linear relationship between output and emissions, we showed that there is a
tendency for output and emissions to increase after the rate-based policy is
implemented. This indicates that there is a possibility that emission targets
will not be achieved using the rate-based policy. However, by setting a more
severe emission rate, it was shown that it is possible to achieve the emission
rate targets. In order to achieve the same emissions targets, we found that
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the profit in the rate-based policy is less than in the cap-and-trade policy.
In Chapter Four, we analyzed a feature of the rate-based policy and
the difference between it and the cap-and-trade policy. It was noted that
rate-based regulation has characteristics that make it difficult to suppress
economic growth, and there is a possibility the emissions will increase. How-
ever, we also showed that emissions can be reduced more in the short term.
Furthermore, we found that because of the effects of technological progress
and capital accumulation in the long run, output and emissions are not re-
duced significantly with the introduction of the rate-based policy or that
there is a possibility that output and emissions would increase more than be-
fore regulation. In addition, since there is a tendency to equalize the output
reduction rate of each sector, we noted that the rate-based policy is desirable
from the viewpoint of fairness.
The conclusion of this thesis is as follows. While it is relatively easy to
introduce direct regulation using the emission rate for each industry, there
is a possibility that there will be additional costs compared to the cap-and-
trade policy, as it dependent on the emission rate target, which has to be
set carefully (Chapter Two). When this regulation is compared to the cap-
and-trade policy, we find that economic efficiency is lower (Chapters Three
and Four), but it is desirable from the viewpoint of equity among industries
(Chapter Four). Although environmental regulation using emission rates
does not hinder economic growth, it is difficult for such regulation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions in the long run (Chapter Four).
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Appendix
1. Description of the static CGE model
1.1 Overview
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1.2 Description
■ In this model, we use the CES function for the utility and production
functions.
■ It is assumed that the optimizing behavior of economic agents will be
displayed (utility maximization and profit maximization).
■ In all scenarios using CGE analysis, we assume the following three
points:
□ The household receives emissions trading revenue from the gov-
ernment.
□ Emissions regulations are imposed only on firms (only firms buy
and sell emission permits).
□ The emission rate in the BaU scenario is considered to be the
emission rate in a base year.
1.3 Notation
Indices for sectors and goods
Notation Description Program
i, j Sectors and goods i,j
e, f Energy goods e,f
ne, nf Non-energy goods ne,nf
Endogenous variables
Notation Description Program
KDi Factor demand for capital K D(i)
LDi Factor demand for labor L D(i)
Y 1Si Composite factor supply in stage 1 Y 1S(i)
Y 1Di Composite factor demand in stage 1 Y 1D(i)
Y 2Se,i Composite factor supply in stage 2 Y 2S(e,i)
Y 2De,i Composite factor demand in stage 2 Y 2D(e,i)
Y 3Si Composite factor supply in stage 3 Y 3S(i)
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Y 3Di Composite factor demand in stage 3 Y 3D(i)
Y Si Goods supply (output) Y S(i)
Y Di Goods demand Y D(i)
XSi Export good X S(i)
MDi Import good M D(i)
AXSi Supply of domestic good A XS(i)
AXDi Demand for domestic good A XD(i)
AYSi Supply of composite good A YS(i)
AYDi Demand for composite good A YD(i)
ASi Supply of intermediate good A S(i)
ADi,j Demand for intermediate good A D(i,j)
CSi Supply of consumption good C S(i)
CDi Household consumption C D(i)
ISi Supply of investment good I S(i)
IDi Demand for investment good I D(i)
GSi Composite goods supply for government G S(i)
GDi Government expenditure G D(i)
U Utility -
CO2hDe CO2 emissions by the household CO2 hD(e)
CO2fDe,i CO2 emissions by firms CO2 fD(e,i)
r Rental price of capital r
w Wage (numeraire) w
pY 1i Price of composite factor Y
1
i p Y1(i)
pY 2e,i Price of composite factor Y
2
e,i p Y2(e,i)
pY 3i Price of composite factor Y
3
i p Y3(i)
pYi Price of goods Yi p Y(i)
pXi Price of export good Xi p X(i)
pMi Price of import good Mi p M(i)
pXAi Price of domestic good A
X
i p XA(i)
pAYi Price of composite good A
Y
i p AY(i)
pAi Price of intermediate good Ai p A(i)
pCi Price of consumption good Ci p C(i)
pIi Price of investment good Ii p I(i)
pGi Demand price by government p G(i)
pCO2 Price of emissions permit p CO2
ε Exchange rate epsilon
I Total income I H
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B Disposal income B
S Total savings S
SH Household savings S H
SG Government savings S G
T Total tax T
TD Direct tax T D
T Yi Production tax T Y(i)
TMi Import tariff T M(i)
Elasticity parameters (exogeneous variables)
Notation Description Program
σKL Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
(= 1)
-
σE Elasticity of substitution between energy good and
composite factor (= 0.5)
sigmma E
ηX Elasticity of transformation between domestic good
and export good (= 4)
eta X
σM Elasticity of substitution between domestic good and
import good (= 4)
sigmma M
σU Elasticity of substitution between consumption
goods (= 1)
-
Parameters in the CES function, etc. (exogeneous variables)
Notation Description Program
βK1i Share coefficient for capital beta K1(i)
βL1i Share coefficient for labor beta L1(i)
a1i Total factor productivity in stage 1 a 1(i)
afEe,i Emission coefficient a fE(e,i)
βY 3i Parameter in stage-3 CES function beta Y3(i)
βA3e,i Parameter in stage-3 CES function beta A3(e,i)
a3i Parameter in stage-3 CES function a 3(i)
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aYi Input requirement coefficient of Y
3D
i for a unit out-
put
a Y(i)
aAi,j Input requirement coefficient of Y
D
i,j for a unit output a A(i,j)
βXAi Parameter in transformation function beta XA(i)
βXi Parameter in transformation function beta X(i)
aXi Scaling coefficient in transformation function a X(i)
βMAi Parameter in Armington composite good production
function
beta MA(i)
βMi Parameter in Armington composite good production
function
beta M(i)
aMi Scaling coeffiecient in Armington composite good
production function
a M(i)
γHi Share coefficient in utility function gamma H(i)
ahEe Emission coefficient in consumption a hE(e)
γIi Expenditure share of total investment gamma I(i)
γGi Share of government expenditure gamma G(i)
Tax rate and savings rate (exogeneous variables)
Notation Description Program
ttYi Production tax rate t tY(i)
ttMi Import tariff rate t tM(i)
ttD Direct tax rate t tD
ssH Average propensity for savings by the household s sH(i)
ssG Average propensity for savings by the government s sG
Other exogeneous variables
Notation Description Program
K Endowments of capital KZ
L Endowments of labor LZ
SF Current account deficits in foreign currency terms S F
pWXi Price of exported good in terms of foreign currency (= 1) p WX(i)
pWMi Price of imported good in terms of foreign currency (= 1) p WM(i)
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CO2S Total supply of emission permits (cap-and-trade policy) CO2 S
αi Emission rate set (rate-based policy) alpha(i)
1.4 Model
■ Firm
[Stage 1]
KDi =
βK1i p
Y 1
i Y
1S
i
r
{KDi }
LDi =
βL1i p
Y 1
i Y
1S
i
r
{LDi }
Y 1Si = a
1
i (K
D
i )
βK1i (LDi )
βL1i {Y 1Si }
[Stage 2]
ADe,i = Y
2S
e,i {ADe,i}
CO2fDe,i = a
fE
e,iY
2S
e,i {CO2fDe,i}
pY 2e,i Y
2S
e,i − (pAe ADe,i + pCO2CO2fDe,i) = 0 {Y 2Se,i }
[Stage 3]
Y 1Di =
(a3i )σE−1σE βY 3i pY 3i
pY 1i
σEY 3Si {Y 1Di }
Y 2De,i =
(a3i )σE−1σE βA3i pY 3i
pY 2e,i
σEY 3Si {Y 2De,i }
Y 3Si = a
3
i
[
βY 3i (Y
1D
i )
σE−1
σE +
∑
e
βA3e,i (Y
2D
e,i )
σE−1
σE
] σE
σE−1
{Y 3Si }
76
[Stage 4]
Y 3Di = a
Y
i Y
S
i {Y 3Di }
ADne,i = a
A
ne,iY
S
i {Y Dne,i}
□ Cap-and-trade policy
(1− ttYi )pYi Y Si −
[
pY 3i Y
3D
i +
∑
ne
pAne,iA
D
ne,i
]
= 0 {Y Si }
□ Rate-based policy
[
(1− ttYi )pYi + αipCO2
]
Y Si −
[
pY 3i Y
3D
i +
∑
ne
pAne,iA
D
ne,i
]
= 0
{Y Si }
■ Armington structure
[Export side]
AXSi =
(aXi )σX+1σX βXAi pYi
pXAi
−σXY Di {AXSi }
XSi =
(aXi )σX+1σX βXi pYi
pXi
−σXY Di {XSi }
Y Di = a
X
i
[
βXAi (A
XS
i )
σX+1
σX + βXi (X
S
i )
σX+1
σX
] σX
σX+1 {Y Di }
[Import side]
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AXDi =
(aMi )σM−1σM βMAi pAYi
pXAi
σMAYSi {AXDi }
MDi =
(aMi )σM−1σM βMi pAYi
(1 + ttMi )p
M
i
σMAYSi {MDi }
AYSi = a
M
i
[
βMAi (A
XD
i )
σM−1
σM + βMi (M
D
i )
σM−1
σM
] σM
σM−1 {AYSi }
■ Goods market
pCi = p
AY
i {CSi }
pIi = p
AY
i {ISi }
pGi = p
AY
i {GSi }
pAi = p
AY
i {ASi }
AYDi = C
S
i + I
S
i +G
S
i + A
S
i {AYDi }
■ Household
CDi =
γHi B
pCi
{CDi }
□ Cap-and-trade policy
rK + wL+ pCO2CO2S = I {I}
□ Rate-based policy
rK + wL = I {I}
SH = ssHI {SH}
TD = ttDI {TD}
I − (SH + TD) = B {B}
CO2hDe = a
hE
e C
D
e {CO2hDe }
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■ Investment
IDi =
γIi S
pIi
{IDi }
S = SH + SG + εSF {S}
■ Government
GDi =
γGi (T − SG)
pGi
{GDi }
T Yi = t
tY
i p
Y
i Y
S
i {T Yi }
TMi = t
tM
i p
M
i M
D
i {TMi }
T = TD +
∑
i
T Yi +
∑
i
TMi {T}
SG = ssGT {SG}
■ International price
pXi = εp
WX
i {pXi }
pMi = εp
WM
i {pMi }
■ Market-clearing conditions
∑
i
KDi = K {r}∑
i
LDi = L {w}
Y 1Di = Y
1S
i {pY 1i }
Y 2De,i = Y
2S
e,i {pY 2e,i }
Y 3Di = Y
3S
i {pY 3i }
Y Di = Y
S
i {pYi }
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∑
j
ADi,j = A
S
i {pAi }
AXDi = A
XS
i {pXAi }
AYDi = A
YS
i {pAYi }
CDi = C
S
i {pCi }
IDi = I
S
i {pIi }
GDi = G
S
i {pGi }∑
i
pWMi M
D
i =
∑
i
pWXi M
S
i + S
F {ε}
□ Cap-and-trade policy∑
i
∑
e
CO2fDe,i = CO2
S {pCO2}
□ Rate-based policy∑
i
∑
e
CO2fDe,i =
∑
i
αiY
S
i {pCO2}
2. Description of the dynamic CGE model
2.1 Overview
The overview is the same as that of the static CGE model.
2.2 Description
■ This model is a recursive dynamic model formed by adding the capital
accumulation equation to the static model.
■ For the capital accumulation equation, we add parameters for adjust-
ing the divergence of the capital accumulation amount and the actual
amount of capital accumulation that is listed in the input–output table.
■ For technological progress to be introduced, we assume the following
two points:
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□ An increase in labor productivity (the same as in the population
growth model).
□ An increase in the input efficiency of energy goods.
2.3 Notation
■ Variables added (exogeneous variables)
Notation Description Program
θ Adjustment parameter in capital accumulation equation theta
δ Depreciation rate delta
λL The rate of increase in labor productivity lambda L
λE The rate of increase in the input efficiency of energy goods lambda E
ϕ Parameter representing the input efficiency of energy goods phi
2.4 Model
We add the following to the static model:
■ Capital accumulation equation
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + θ
∑
i
IDi,t
■ Technological progress on labor productivity
Lt+1 = (1 + λL)Lt
We modify part of the static model as shown below.
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■ Technological progress on the input efficiency of energy goods
Y 3Si = a
3
i
[
βY 3i (Y
1D
i )
σE−1
σE +
∑
e
βA3e,i (ϕY
2D
e,i )
σE−1
σE
] σE
σE−1
{Y 3Si }
Y 2De,i =
(a3i )σE−1σE βA3i pY 3i
pY 2e,i
σEϕσE−1Y 3Si {p2De,i }
ϕt+T = (1 + λE)
Tϕt
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2.5 GAMS program (dynamic model under the rate-
based policy in Subsection 4.5.2)
$Title Dynamic CGE Model with Rate-based Regulation
Set u /agr,foss,omn,food,tex,pulp,chem,p_c,nmm,iron
nfm,fmp,mch,eleq,iteq,semi,treq,preq,omf,cns
ely,ghs,wat,trd,fin,dwe,trp,itc,pubs,edu
mhs,opub,bsrv,psrv
CAP,LAB,IDT,TRF,HOH,GOV,INV,EXT/
i(u) /agr,foss,omn,food,tex,pulp,chem,p_c,nmm,iron
nfm,fmp,mch,eleq,iteq,semi,treq,preq,omf,cns
ely,ghs,wat,trd,fin,dwe,trp,itc,pubs,edu
mhs,opub,bsrv,psrv/
e(i) /foss,p_c,ghs/
ne(i) /agr,omn,food,tex,pulp,chem,nmm,iron,nfm,fmp
mch,eleq,iteq,semi,treq,preq,omf,cns,ely,wat
trd,fin,dwe,trp,itc,pubs,edu,mhs,opub,bsrv
psrv/
;
Alias (u,v),(i,j),(e,f),(ne,nf);
Table SAM(u,v)
agr foss omn food tex
agr 1643.017 0.332 0.172 7111.018 35.881
foss 0 0.126 0 0.063 0.027
omn 0.626 0 2.893 0 0.01
food 1244.658 0 0 5369.035 13.1
tex 57.427 0.363 4.208 42.653 1148.899
pulp 183.143 0.538 1.902 570.337 34.215
chem 573.052 0.194 8.073 326.655 481.198
p_c 260.168 0.394 15.275 159.907 32.434
nmm 17.577 0.157 0.039 137.336 2.235
iron 1.038 1.05 0.762 0 0.22
nfm 0 0.15 0.109 52.627 0.161
fmp 14.747 3.814 17.39 629.438 8.335
mch 0.234 0.234 4.165 0.002 0
eleq 3.221 0.001 0.31 0.11 0
iteq 0.086 0 0.02 0.185 0.107
semi 0.005 0 0 0.088 0.007
treq 67.599 0 0.04 0 0
preq 2.786 0.016 0.017 0.113 0.08
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omf 131.441 1.042 8.321 981.769 124.945
cns 65.697 0.733 5.785 57.602 16.915
ely 99.738 8.397 26.078 364.564 69.994
ghs 0.314 0.045 0.057 72.639 7.699
wat 12.729 0.65 3.74 119.959 17.746
trd 543.366 2.079 23.874 2888.79 346.162
fin 226.281 7.145 62.863 330.764 195.251
dwe 4.52 2.858 4.971 51.378 15.435
trp 633.183 5.642 270.375 1211.601 114.824
itc 37.206 3.169 8.098 139.738 41.28
pubs 0 0 0 0 0
edu 10.891 2.389 2.156 224.374 27.141
mhs 0.859 0 0 0 0
opub 3.252 0.508 1.719 27.758 5.237
bsrv 184.088 9.605 39.093 1125.631 130.624
psrv 180.256 2.516 7.92 206.543 21.996
CAP 5082.506 21.743 109.842 5177.591 216.812
LAB 1435.01 34.609 203.114 5070.029 1112.775
IDT 433.854 12.472 52.029 3439.053 153.046
TRF 149.278 1219.45 86.489 1042.176 393.023
HOH
GOV
INV
EXT 2092.569 12324.51 1729.781 4625.095 3205.556
+ pulp chem p_c nmm iron
agr 413.493 31.173 0.609 0.856 0.002
foss 38.882 66.038 10108.895 54.779 217.274
omn 11.851 70.422 -2.246 422.656 717.782
food 21.723 120.839 0.064 3.474 0.022
tex 87.547 23.589 3.693 22.27 11.743
pulp 3455.155 395.63 0.322 149.913 16.805
chem 407.462 9007.825 30.394 192.188 99.921
p_c 61.702 2049.077 661.698 141.097 623.266
nmm 79.344 154.053 7.262 574.809 147.12
iron 126.419 1.201 -0.008 64.916 13290.958
nfm 28.663 120.038 0.106 40.183 198.534
fmp 170.957 242.158 10.859 76.615 20.079
mch 17.727 0.769 0.091 22.233 8.63
eleq 1.731 0.443 0 0.033 0
iteq 0.158 1.897 0.041 0.181 0.125
semi 0.141 0.211 0.015 0.008 0.042
treq 0 0 0 0 0
preq 0.688 0.6 0.006 0.386 0.07
omf 383.204 530.064 11.594 98.581 254.718
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cns 84.255 178.017 16.22 100.221 153.842
ely 378.234 618.391 108.425 181.769 677.477
ghs 9.624 36.194 0.929 26.125 84.535
wat 48.945 197.94 8.522 37.968 50.057
trd 1090.315 1177.229 194.258 329.827 1023.014
fin 243.197 414.955 94.525 192.43 237.889
dwe 36.937 79.979 6.388 23.63 41.572
trp 541.976 708.525 464.441 466.479 569.473
itc 89.248 404.359 17.462 73.785 91.03
pubs 0 0 0 0 0
edu 79.967 2022.341 38.019 255.602 193.713
mhs 0.021 0.366 0 0 0.048
opub 9.374 44.505 6.574 7.819 21.655
bsrv 376.205 1383.206 82.875 380.67 397.971
psrv 83.852 61.356 6.877 70.965 120.761
CAP 1516.709 3437.378 373.713 1141.603 2928.599
LAB 2521.838 3270.582 304.251 1696.896 2463.19
IDT 412.016 635.6 4363.296 304.962 652.113
TRF 125.715 227.213 147.462 28.191 52.492
HOH
GOV
INV
EXT 1911.727 3807.771 2591.158 504.382 897.012
+ nfm fmp mch eleq iteq
agr 0.274 0 0 0 0
foss 2.643 0.263 0.454 0.269 0.063
omn 911.355 0.617 1.052 0 0
food 0 0 0 0 0
tex 10.793 16.431 40.731 49.745 18.392
pulp 30.638 56.296 54.599 116.664 73.695
chem 84.233 104.615 171.716 198.184 81.407
p_c 36.16 32.574 40.425 14.959 4.204
nmm 56.388 44.051 165.854 126.719 21.541
iron 11.401 2678.153 2450.737 597.523 82.749
nfm 2884.344 807.55 619.779 1020.074 273.674
fmp 18.097 745.261 1126.294 392.976 169.983
mch 3.675 25.218 6152.528 243.52 36.462
eleq 0.317 12.225 762.289 1630.728 245.726
iteq 0.143 0.388 17.224 1.66 355.948
semi 1.849 42.574 866.882 1606.785 3728.46
treq 0 0 3.875 0 0
preq 0.053 0.369 155.237 14.217 25.62
omf 185.518 103.956 724.335 655.097 493.596
cns 39.049 109.33 88.024 62.443 28.035
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ely 161.477 180.473 265.148 135.783 64.805
ghs 10.114 21.209 14.966 18.374 3.649
wat 13.317 18.123 71.935 23.022 8.25
trd 354.572 667.424 1933.937 1084.816 780.859
fin 126.216 208.774 425.658 151.325 105.731
dwe 12.04 45.926 82.649 47.858 23.9
trp 262.096 384.07 620.683 326.601 215.122
itc 55.042 148.54 359.357 256.92 205.202
pubs 0 0 0 0 0
edu 152.626 118.247 986.641 1252.244 770.294
mhs 0 0 0 0 0
opub 2.526 15.406 53.207 11.152 14.973
bsrv 177.447 432.587 1294.374 753.692 510.155
psrv 32.402 61.407 223.219 75.468 35.579
CAP 521.084 1077.67 3012.913 1335.596 728.701
LAB 959.785 3920.946 7007.883 3382.241 1737.888
IDT 212.333 403.775 583.885 245.434 166.961
TRF 132.934 34.909 134.34 135.632 211.942
HOH
GOV
INV
EXT 2474.045 630.672 2648.703 2429.477 4101.871
+ semi treq preq omf cns
agr 0 0.057 0 204.87 87.905
foss 0.313 3.608 0 0.315 0.009
omn 0 0 0.043 10.675 502.655
food 0 0 0 24.435 0
tex 58.995 99.688 5.507 114.725 182.19
pulp 100.489 76.596 23.382 1023.329 2929.128
chem 274.366 530.011 24.56 3228.057 275.895
p_c 29.35 108.325 3.501 46.662 704.416
nmm 474.242 402.557 89.909 87.362 3623.305
iron 73.058 2454.127 47.635 76.416 1458.233
nfm 496.266 1022.919 95.039 192.419 497.465
fmp 273.103 519.881 76.117 229.324 6190.568
mch 56.826 531.441 34.111 63.384 417.882
eleq 369.089 1364.437 63.127 7.145 493.668
iteq 2.97 401.148 0.117 1.566 105.975
semi 4988.634 394.172 626.405 108.884 13.526
treq 0 24604.589 0 0 0
preq 6.922 34.049 77.386 5.013 6.54
omf 441.127 2044.834 177.444 4287.057 1047.942
cns 89.032 68.037 14.631 92.3 143.85
ely 305.356 429.778 38.766 388.776 210.831
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ghs 28.435 78.1 3.729 19.017 45.386
wat 42.801 59.246 8.559 43.208 148.729
trd 682.884 2553.585 220.555 1780.332 4123.288
fin 162.307 404.587 96.922 453.468 937.841
dwe 24.785 42.728 10.253 75.21 160.378
trp 304.665 886.901 72.008 1170.495 3343.445
itc 166.076 193.154 32 212.414 757.075
pubs 0 0 0 0 0
edu 1654.923 1823.954 235.196 457.185 79.319
mhs 0 0 0 0.039 0.02
opub 10.812 16.471 2.443 20.402 60.666
bsrv 726.556 1577.766 173.114 925.597 4957.399
psrv 40.256 80.18 10.717 123.07 538.934
CAP 955.029 2524.89 377.004 2644.641 4031.753
LAB 3144.015 6899.095 985.003 6738.348 23268.06
IDT 228.074 785.407 97.51 738.708 1893.048
TRF 181.345 130.609 70.142 262.174 0
HOH
GOV
INV
EXT 3626.958 2674.069 1414.262 3182.179 0
+ ely ghs wat trd fin
agr 0 0 0 9.311 0
foss 2331.866 975.105 0.245 0 0
omn -0.214 0 0 0 0
food 0 0 0 16.52 0
tex 2.443 1.119 12.093 375.143 66.539
pulp 32.599 1.938 26.298 806.118 189.829
chem 7.665 8.424 117.245 0.883 1.184
p_c 942.934 123.29 118.105 224.977 18.48
nmm 0.927 0.257 21.48 36.241 0.77
iron 0 0 2.913 0 0
nfm 13.149 0 1.153 1.42 0
fmp 10.4 3.842 5.265 332.702 2.552
mch 0 0.165 32.927 0.777 0
eleq 0.111 0 0.674 28.918 0.242
iteq 0.143 0.048 0.365 14.634 2.864
semi 0.249 0.016 0.075 4.14 2.831
treq 0 0 0 0 0
preq 0 0 0.672 156.441 2.81
omf 124.946 37.277 247.882 1119.446 867.455
cns 844.756 201.494 231.683 651.679 164.048
ely 561.061 61.331 357.877 1428.977 108.006
ghs 12.825 43.284 15.236 273.498 25.721
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wat 116.853 14.52 493.129 337.432 112.246
trd 288.481 90.74 173.704 1826.085 252.847
fin 602.405 33.048 74.613 5707.629 4478.944
dwe 119.762 41.963 18.237 2879.732 569.767
trp 362.879 135.775 289.057 5458.445 819.735
itc 278.256 63.284 255.263 4223.835 2328.652
pubs 0 0 0 0 0
edu 396.234 41.213 1.231 327.863 19.473
mhs 0 0.023 0.206 2.129 1.134
opub 19.499 9.148 53.817 52.324 103.13
bsrv 1378.967 134.381 596.623 6035.146 4674.937
psrv 62.41 12.191 77.212 1130.577 270.936
CAP 4231.709 403.822 2044.296 24623.782 13054.601
LAB 1914.977 453.536 2807.223 44454.926 12657.01
IDT 1125.075 2.565 229.672 3732.782 790.042
TRF 0 0 0 0 0
HOH
GOV
INV
EXT 1.079 0.183 1.716 704.6 499.171
+ dwe trp itc pubs edu
agr 0.081 1.939 0 2.14 34.205
foss 0 0.057 0 0.031 5.111
omn 0 0 0 0.398 0
food 0 8.619 0.009 9.467 30.59
tex 1.582 87.075 59.419 93.891 16.443
pulp 34.957 298.732 874.319 78.586 204.035
chem 1.113 20.499 93.291 29.467 187.027
p_c 32.472 5205.624 47.257 334.11 272.335
nmm 2.533 1.98 0.466 7.705 63.175
iron 0 13.822 0 0.928 0
nfm 0 0.546 1.994 6.439 1.601
fmp 17.331 75.088 12.668 174.282 4.203
mch 0 4.831 0.414 12.027 0
eleq 0.647 10.369 8.756 66.606 14.23
iteq 1.519 3.639 6.348 79.591 1.67
semi 0 0.172 73.69 134.571 53.174
treq 0 737.675 0 764.324 1.568
preq 0.303 1.798 17.101 30.745 0.562
omf 29.435 231.861 1475.13 982.398 872.116
cns 3047.681 505.823 233.419 588.219 453.558
ely 178.753 682.572 292.9 402.545 691.598
ghs 15.579 23.302 21.768 43.846 92.711
wat 25.486 262.486 165.49 818.929 390.269
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trd 72.325 1665.151 714.522 581.473 702.208
fin 3798.522 2220.168 636.153 126.344 314.064
dwe 378.002 749.394 897.579 36.347 284.839
trp 150.947 5919.613 1106.699 1195.672 705.266
itc 137.929 604.955 4763.584 1338.661 1095.032
pubs 0 0 0 0 0
edu 0.17 99.285 503.975 6.396 85.024
mhs 0.09 2.612 2.107 0.322 0.336
opub 20.495 58.113 48.368 0.253 50.553
bsrv 1385.73 6605.944 5725.66 2091.211 1863.246
psrv 303.604 373.667 1025.92 110.953 677.274
CAP 50656.597 6667.041 10902.527 11556.133 4429.425
LAB 2310.99 15596.181 14628.841 16726.239 22452.818
IDT 3601.062 2003.767 1595.583 106.628 242.912
TRF 0 0 6.127 0 0
HOH
GOV
INV
EXT 1.463 3667.297 707.962 0 641.415
+ mhs opub bsrv psrv CAP
agr 225.434 8.564 1.006 1038.617
foss 0.408 0 0.275 1.411
omn 0 0 0 -0.458
food 706.339 6.492 0.5 5392.041
tex 165.954 98.446 125.784 245.273
pulp 274.72 84.212 221.657 1019.272
chem 6476.823 10.848 239.539 460.743
p_c 185.324 27.186 115.337 372.96
nmm 59.501 3.764 70.715 144.205
iron 0.388 0.024 7.778 47.623
nfm 61.574 0.812 19.814 51.347
fmp 16.119 8.893 85.875 136.533
mch 0 0 1758.344 117.807
eleq 2.83 0 438.304 21
iteq 1.035 0.45 127.339 6.466
semi 0.062 0 701.535 40.667
treq 0 0 1833.918 3.091
preq 444.924 0.122 44.82 17.469
omf 336.818 252.709 1443.848 834.134
cns 293.525 13.406 175.208 301.196
ely 520.92 12.658 277.226 897.281
ghs 126.409 7.787 13.493 368.789
wat 537.219 15.385 73.84 1226.996
trd 2835.627 183.921 1708.624 3917.266
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fin 660.311 88.074 2533.832 3137.201
dwe 307.729 94.826 322.496 748.569
trp 870.549 138.163 949.123 1861.913
itc 751.008 337.643 5906.722 1316.431
pubs 0 0 0 1109.667
edu 7.595 0 98.904 163.932
mhs 893.38 0.053 0.439 3.33
opub 57.901 0 129.787 209.056
bsrv 2276.151 369.527 5963.626 1955.312
psrv 962.798 49.154 476.684 906.602
CAP 5669.808 366.078 14046.623 10361.201
LAB 24491.127 2825.959 22014.076 16130.737
IDT -8.913 25.478 1822.059 2942.157
TRF 0 0 1.203 1.245
HOH 0 0 0 0 196229.42
GOV
INV
EXT 2.07 33.851 1040.258 3536.191 0
+ LAB IDT TRF HOH GOV
agr 3563.257 0
foss 0.023 0
omn -15.077 0
food 27746.44 327.785
tex 3895.92 0
pulp 592.863 1.684
chem 2823.92 0
p_c 5887.602 0
nmm 256.201 0
iron -32.731 0
nfm 108.25 0
fmp 351.236 0.508
mch 92.02 0.038
eleq 2910.042 0
iteq 4968.416 0
semi 240.602 0
treq 5567.891 0
preq 918.244 0.088
omf 3556.985 4.297
cns 0 0
ely 4566.142 0
ghs 1327.889 0
wat 2134.662 634.473
trd 48570.364 6.873
fin 11941.943 0
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dwe 57908.362 37.145
trp 15403.112 -74.768
itc 11191.24 35.886
pubs 786.643 36641.567
edu 7608.327 16803.455
mhs 12683.196 36622.546
opub 3895.555 0
bsrv 4617.297 0
psrv 51609.133 0
CAP
LAB
IDT
TRF
HOH 275620.198 0 0 0 0
GOV 0 34024.445 4774.091 55562.241 0
INV 0 0 0 118611.408 3319.2
EXT
+ INV EXT
agr 919.745 62.464
foss -141.747 0.125
omn 35.666 30.974
food 249.404 265.065
tex 181.004 545.653
pulp 477.699 354.708
chem 92.943 4850.314
p_c -159.602 884.805
nmm 58.251 748.471
iron 33.521 2772.68
nfm 91.421 1227.366
fmp 334.458 642.078
mch 15062.868 8460.183
eleq 4418.276 5521.593
iteq 5081.438 4139.533
semi 8.732 6380.855
treq 6877.258 15359.168
preq 1843.296 1397.534
omf 1236.943 2698.936
cns 54117.611 0
ely 0 30.339
ghs 0 0.705
wat 0 13.326
trd 12967.223 8620.512
fin 0 654.576
dwe 0 19.254
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trp 877.505 5669.407
itc 8397.087 333.423
pubs 0 0
edu 0 384.294
mhs 0 0.211
opub 0 20.027
bsrv 2810 668.198
psrv 0 1011.884
CAP
LAB
IDT
TRF
HOH
GOV
INV 0 -6059.608
EXT
;
Table CO2_f(e,i)
agr foss omn food tex
foss 0.003023707 0.001398241 0.00059965
p_c 15.11480196 0.014716884 0.870048916 10.48892293 2.509503587
ghs 0.009624573 0.000765591 0.001747094 3.242726682 0.29515513
+ pulp chem p_c nmm iron
foss 9.947160758 8.027987232 0.360089881 14.68953407 34.45642805
p_c 4.868708083 31.17368038 38.50358157 13.86762782 113.9203237
ghs 0.254997431 1.408511129 0.037674243 1.174474108 3.847621829
+ nfm fmp mch eleq iteq
foss 0.341012334 0.011375438 0.011112384 0.006584837 0.001541553
p_c 2.944239534 2.137828956 1.949684024 0.811467061 0.223153748
ghs 0.445156282 0.950559483 0.675667058 0.819164457 0.16421927
+ semi treq preq omf cns
foss 0.00766251 0.088322047 0.069970492 0.001997891
p_c 1.71506244 5.12064975 0.248450308 3.067167803 10.45820312
ghs 1.237584452 3.504357035 0.154617325 0.304336565 1.439058398
+ ely ghs wat trd fin
foss 343.0940969 0.074633808 0.05441636
p_c 61.28226058 0.575549063 7.231292682 11.65560348 0.692538345
ghs 0.357986392 1.376810759 0.461769229 5.655177467 0.266765093
+ dwe trp itc pubs edu
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foss 0.012656766 0.006882776 1.135312997
p_c 1.455156552 184.8284919 2.059285165 10.33578022 9.450675937
ghs 0.277556909 0.577788322 0.286515832 0.674036877 1.693516521
+ mhs opub bsrv psrv
foss 0.090621649 0.059721755 0.313410516
p_c 8.503008162 1.163536151 4.114261523 14.70968552
ghs 2.306506944 0.141154426 0.182150316 6.636040022
;
Table CO2_h(e,*)
HOH
foss 0.005106454
p_c 148.4764964
ghs 22.29710153
;
Parameter K_DZ(i),KZ,L_DZ(i),LZ,Y_1DZ(i),Y_1SZ(i),Y_2DZ(e,i),Y_2SZ(e,i)
Y_3DZ(i),Y_3SZ(i),A_DZ(i,j),A_SZ(i),Y_DZ(i),Y_SZ(i),A_XDZ(i)
A_XSZ(i),A_YDZ(i),A_YSZ(i),G_DZ(i),G_SZ(i),I_DZ(i),I_SZ(i)
C_DZ(i),C_SZ(i),C_CDZ(e),C_CSZ(e),CO2_hDZ(e),CO2_fDZ(e,i)
M_DZ(i),X_SZ(i),I_HZ,BZ,SZ,S_HZ,S_GZ,TZ,T_DZ,T_YZ(i),T_MZ(i)
S_F,p_WM(i),P_WX(i),alpha(i);
K_DZ(i) = SAM("CAP",i);
KZ = SAM("HOH",’CAP’);
L_DZ(i) = SAM("LAB",i);
LZ = SAM("HOH",’LAB’);
Y_1DZ(i) = K_DZ(i)+L_DZ(i);
Y_1SZ(i) = Y_1DZ(i);
Y_2DZ(e,i) = SAM(e,i);
Y_2SZ(e,i) = Y_2DZ(e,i);
Y_3DZ(i) = Y_1DZ(i)+sum(e,Y_2DZ(e,i));
Y_3SZ(i) = Y_3DZ(i);
A_DZ(i,j) = SAM(i,j);
A_SZ(i) = sum(j,A_DZ(i,j));
Y_DZ(i) = Y_3DZ(i)+sum(ne,A_DZ(ne,i))+SAM("IDT",i);
Y_SZ(i) = Y_DZ(i);
A_XDZ(i) = Y_DZ(i)-SAM(i,"EXT");
A_XSZ(i) = A_XDZ(i);
A_YDZ(i) = A_XDZ(i)+SAM("EXT",i)+SAM("TRF",i);
A_YSZ(i) = A_YDZ(i);
G_DZ(i) = SAM(i,"GOV");
G_SZ(i) = G_DZ(i);
I_DZ(i) = SAM(i,"INV");
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I_SZ(i) = I_DZ(i);
C_DZ(i) = SAM(i,"HOH");
C_SZ(i) = C_DZ(i);
C_CDZ(e) = SAM(e,"HOH");
C_CSZ(e) = C_CDZ(e);
CO2_hDZ(e) = CO2_h(e,"HOH");
CO2_fDZ(e,i) = CO2_f(e,i);
M_DZ(i) = SAM("EXT",i);
X_SZ(i) = SAM(i,"EXT");
I_HZ = KZ+LZ;
BZ = I_HZ-SAM("INV","HOH")-SAM("GOV","HOH");
SZ = SAM("INV","HOH")+SAM("INV","GOV")+SAM("INV","EXT");
S_HZ = SAM("INV","HOH");
S_GZ = SAM("INV","GOV");
TZ = SAM("GOV","HOH")+sum(i,SAM("IDT",i))+sum(i,SAM("TRF",i));
T_DZ = SAM("GOV","HOH");
T_YZ(i) = SAM("IDT",i);
T_MZ(i) = SAM("TRF",i);
S_F = SAM("INV","EXT");
p_WM(i) = 1;
p_WX(i) = 1;
alpha(i) = sum(e,CO2_fDZ(e,i))/Y_SZ(i);
Display K_DZ,KZ,L_DZ,LZ,Y_1DZ,Y_1SZ,Y_2DZ,Y_2SZ,Y_3DZ,Y_3SZ,A_DZ,A_SZ,Y_DZ
Y_SZ,A_XDZ,A_XSZ,A_YDZ,A_YSZ,G_DZ,G_SZ,I_DZ,I_SZ,C_DZ,C_SZ,C_CDZ
C_CSZ,CO2_hDZ,CO2_fDZ,M_DZ,X_SZ,I_HZ,BZ,SZ,S_HZ,S_GZ,TZ,T_DZ,T_YZ
T_MZ,S_F,p_WM,P_WX,alpha;
Parameter sigmma_E,sigmma_M,eta_X;
sigmma_E = 0.5;
sigmma_M = 4;
eta_X = 4;
Display sigmma_E,sigmma_M,eta_X;
Parameter gamma_H(i),a_hE(e),s_sH,t_tD,gamma_G(i),s_sG,gamma_I(i),beta_K1(i)
beta_L1(i),a_1(i),a_fE(e,i),a_3(i),beta_Y3(i),beta_A3(e,i),a_Y(i)
a_A(i,j),a_X(i),beta_XA(i),beta_X(i),a_M(i),beta_MA(i),beta_M(i)
t_tM(i),t_tY(i),CO2Z_f,CO2Z_all,CO2Z_each(i),phi(e,i);
gamma_H(ne) = C_DZ(ne)/BZ;
gamma_H(e) = C_CDZ(e)/BZ;
a_hE(e) = CO2_hDZ(e)/C_CSZ(e);
s_sH = S_HZ/I_HZ;
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t_tD = T_DZ/I_HZ;
gamma_G(i) = G_DZ(i)/(TZ-S_GZ);
s_sG = S_GZ/TZ;
gamma_I(i) = I_DZ(i)/SZ;
beta_K1(i) = K_DZ(i)/Y_1SZ(i);
beta_L1(i) = L_DZ(i)/Y_1SZ(i);
a_1(i) = Y_1SZ(i)/(K_DZ(i)**beta_K1(i)*L_DZ(i)**beta_L1(i));
a_fE(e,i) = (CO2_fDZ(e,i)/Y_2SZ(e,i))$Y_2SZ(e,i);
beta_Y3(i) = Y_1DZ(i)**(1/sigmma_E)/(Y_1DZ(i)**(1/sigmma_E)
+sum(e,Y_2DZ(e,i)**(1/sigmma_E)));
beta_A3(e,i) = Y_2DZ(e,i)**(1/sigmma_E)/(Y_1DZ(i)**(1/sigmma_E)
+sum(f,Y_2DZ(f,i)**(1/sigmma_E)));
a_3(i) = Y_3SZ(i)/(beta_Y3(i)*Y_1DZ(i)**((sigmma_E-1)
/sigmma_E)+sum(e,beta_A3(e,i)*Y_2DZ(e,i)
**((sigmma_E-1)/sigmma_E)))**(sigmma_E/(sigmma_E-1));
a_Y(i) = Y_3DZ(i)/Y_SZ(i);
a_A(ne,i) = A_DZ(ne,i)/Y_SZ(i);
beta_XA(i) = A_XSZ(i)**(-1/eta_X)/(A_XSZ(i)**(-1/eta_X)
+(X_SZ(i)**(-1/eta_X))$X_SZ(i));
beta_X(i) = (X_SZ(i)**(-1/eta_X))$X_SZ(i)/(A_XSZ(i)**(-1/eta_X)
+(X_SZ(i)**(-1/eta_X))$X_SZ(i));
a_X(i) = Y_DZ(i)/(beta_XA(i)*A_XSZ(i)**((eta_X+1)/eta_X)+beta_X(i)
*X_SZ(i)**((eta_X+1)/eta_X))**(eta_X/(eta_X+1));
t_tM(i) = (T_MZ(i)/M_DZ(i))$M_DZ(i);
beta_MA(i) = A_XDZ(i)**(1/sigmma_M)/(A_XDZ(i)**(1/sigmma_M)
+(1+t_tM(i))*M_DZ(i)**(1/sigmma_M));
beta_M(i) = (1+t_tM(i))*M_DZ(i)**(1/sigmma_M)/(A_XDZ(i)
**(1/sigmma_M)+(1+t_tM(i))*M_DZ(i)**(1/sigmma_M));
a_M(i) = A_YSZ(i)/(beta_MA(i)*A_XDZ(i)**((sigmma_M-1)
/sigmma_M)+beta_M(i)*M_DZ(i)**((sigmma_M-1)
/sigmma_M))**(sigmma_M/(sigmma_M-1));
t_tY(i) = T_YZ(i)/Y_SZ(i);
CO2Z_f = sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fDZ(e,i)));
CO2Z_all = sum(e,CO2_hDZ(e))+sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fDZ(e,i)));
CO2Z_each(i) = sum(e,CO2_fDZ(e,i));
phi(e,i) = 1;
Display gamma_H,a_hE,s_sH,t_tD,gamma_G,s_sG,gamma_I,beta_K1,beta_L1,a_1
a_fE,a_3,beta_Y3,beta_A3,a_Y,a_A,a_X,beta_XA,beta_X,a_M,beta_MA
beta_M,t_tM,t_tY,CO2Z_f,CO2Z_all,CO2Z_each,phi;
Variable K_D(i),L_D(i),Y_1D(i),Y_1S(i),Y_2D(e,i),Y_2S(i,j),Y_3D(i),Y_3S(i)
A_D(i,j),A_S(i),Y_D(i),Y_S(i),A_XD(i),A_XS(i),A_YD(i),A_YS(i)
G_D(i),G_S(i),I_D(i),I_S(i),C_D(i),C_S(i),C_CD(e),C_CS(i)
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CO2_hD(e),CO2_fD(e,i),M_D(i),X_S(i),r,w,p_Y1(i),p_Y2(e,i),p_Y3(i)
p_A(i),p_Y(i),p_XA(i),p_AY(i),p_G(i),p_I(i),p_C(i),p_CC(e)
p_CO2,epsilon,I_H,B,S,S_H,S_G,T,T_D,T_Y(i),T_M(i),P_M(i),P_X(i);
Equation EQK_D(i),EQL_D(i),EQY_1D(i),EQY_1S(i),EQY_2D(e,i),EQY_2S(e,i)
EQY_3D(i),EQY_3S(i),EQA_D(i,j),EQA_S(i),EQY_D(i),EQY_S(i)
EQA_XD(i),EQA_XS(i),EQA_YD(i),EQA_YS(i),EQG_D(i),EQG_S(i)
EQI_D(i),EQI_S(i),EQC_D(i),EQC_S(i),EQC_CD(e),EQC_CS(e)
EQCO2_hD(e),EQCO2_fD(e,i),EQM_D(i),EQX_S(i),EQr,EQw
EQp_Y1(i),EQp_Y2(e,i),EQp_Y3(i),EQp_A(i),EQp_Y(i)
EQp_XA(i),EQp_AY(i),EQp_G(i),EQp_I(i),EQp_C(i),EQp_CC(e)
EQp_CO2,EQepsilon,EQI_H,EQB,EQS,EQS_H,EQS_G,EQT,EQT_D,EQT_Y(i)
EQT_M(i),EQp_M(i),EQp_X(i);
EQK_D(i).. K_D(i) =e= beta_K1(i)*p_Y1(i)*Y_1S(i)/r;
EQL_D(i).. L_D(i) =e= beta_L1(i)*p_Y1(i)*Y_1S(i)/w;
EQY_1D(i).. Y_1D(i) =e= (a_3(i)**((sigmma_E-1)/sigmma_E)*beta_Y3(i)
*p_Y3(i)/p_Y1(i))**sigmma_E*Y_3S(i);
EQY_1S(i).. Y_1S(i) =e= a_1(i)*K_D(i)**beta_K1(i)*L_D(i)**beta_L1(i);
EQY_2D(e,i).. Y_2D(e,i) =e= (a_3(i)**((sigmma_E-1)/sigmma_E)
*beta_A3(e,i)*p_Y3(i)/p_Y2(e,i))
**sigmma_E*Y_3S(i)*phi(e,i)**(sigmma_E-1);
EQY_2S(e,i).. p_Y2(e,i)*Y_2S(e,i)-(p_A(e)*A_D(e,i)+p_CO2*CO2_fD(e,i))=e= 0;
EQY_3D(i).. Y_3D(i) =e= a_Y(i)*Y_S(i);
EQY_3S(i).. Y_3S(i) =e= a_3(i)*(beta_Y3(i)*Y_1D(i)**((sigmma_E-1)
/sigmma_E)+sum(e$Y_2DZ(e,i),beta_A3(e,i)
*(phi(e,i)*Y_2D(e,i))**((sigmma_E-1)/sigmma_E)))
**(sigmma_E/(sigmma_E-1));
EQA_D(j,i).. A_D(j,i) =e= Y_2S(j,i)$e(j)+(a_A(j,i)*Y_S(i))$ne(j);
EQA_S(i).. p_A(i) =e= p_AY(i);
EQY_D(i).. Y_D(i) =e= a_X(i)*(beta_XA(i)*A_XS(i)**((eta_X+1)/eta_X)
+(beta_X(i)*X_S(i)**((eta_X+1)/eta_X))
$X_SZ(i))**(eta_X/(eta_X+1));
EQY_S(i).. (1-t_tY(i))*p_Y(i)*Y_S(i)+alpha(i)*p_CO2*Y_S(i)
-(p_Y3(i)*Y_3D(i)+sum(ne,p_A(ne)*A_D(ne,i))) =e= 0;
EQA_XD(i).. A_XD(i) =e= (a_M(i)**((sigmma_M-1)/sigmma_M)
*beta_MA(i)*p_AY(i)/p_XA(i))**sigmma_M*A_YS(i);
EQA_XS(i).. A_XS(i) =e= (a_X(i)**((eta_X+1)/eta_X)*beta_XA(i)*p_Y(i)
/p_XA(i))**(-eta_X)*Y_D(i);
EQA_YD(i).. A_YD(i) =e= C_S(i)+G_S(i)+I_S(i)+A_S(i);
EQA_YS(i).. A_YS(i) =e= a_M(i)*(beta_MA(i)*A_XD(i)**((sigmma_M-1)
/sigmma_M)+(beta_M(i)*M_D(i)**((sigmma_M-1)
/sigmma_M))$M_DZ(i))**(sigmma_M/(sigmma_M-1));
EQG_D(i).. G_D(i) =e= gamma_G(i)*(T-S_G)/p_G(i);
EQG_S(i).. p_G(i) =e= p_AY(i);
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EQI_D(i).. I_D(i) =e= gamma_I(i)*S/p_I(i);
EQI_S(i).. p_I(i) =e= p_AY(i);
EQC_D(i).. C_D(i) =e= (gamma_H(i)*B/p_C(i))$ne(i)+C_CS(i)$e(i);
EQC_S(i).. p_C(i) =e= p_AY(i);
EQC_CD(e).. C_CD(e) =e= gamma_H(e)*B/p_CC(e);
EQC_CS(e).. p_CC(e)*C_CS(e)-p_C(e)*C_D(e) =e= 0;
EQCO2_hD(e).. CO2_hD(e) =e= a_hE(e)*C_CS(e);
EQCO2_fD(e,i).. CO2_fD(e,i) =e= a_fE(e,i)*Y_2S(e,i);
EQM_D(i).. M_D(i) =e= (a_M(i)**((sigmma_M-1)/sigmma_M)
*beta_M(i)*p_AY(i)/((1+t_tM(i))*p_M(i)))
**sigmma_M*A_YS(i);
EQX_S(i).. X_S(i) =e= ((a_X(i)**((eta_X+1)/eta_X)*beta_X(i)
*p_Y(i)/p_X(i))**(-eta_X))$beta_X(i)*Y_D(i);
EQr.. sum(i,K_D(i)) =e= KZ;
EQw.. sum(i,L_D(i)) =e= LZ;
EQp_Y1(i).. Y_1D(i) =e= Y_1S(i);
EQp_Y2(e,i).. Y_2D(e,i) =e= Y_2S(e,i);
EQp_Y3(i).. Y_3D(i) =e= Y_3S(i);
EQp_A(i).. sum(j,A_D(i,j)) =e= A_S(i);
EQp_Y(i).. Y_D(i) =e= Y_S(i);
EQp_XA(i).. A_XD(i) =e= A_XS(i);
EQp_AY(i).. A_YD(i) =e= A_YS(i);
EQp_G(i).. G_D(i) =e= G_S(i);
EQp_I(i).. I_D(i) =e= I_S(i);
EQp_C(i).. C_D(i) =e= C_S(i);
EQp_CC(e).. C_CD(e) =e= C_CS(e);
EQp_CO2.. sum(i,alpha(i)*Y_S(i)) =g= sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fD(e,i)));
EQepsilon.. sum(i,p_WM(i)*M_D(i)) =e= sum(i,p_WX(i)*X_S(i))+S_F;
EQI_H.. r*KZ+w*LZ =e= I_H;
EQB.. I_H-(S_H+T_D) =e= B;
EQS.. S =e= S_H+S_G+epsilon*S_F;
EQS_H.. S_H =e= s_sH*I_H;
EQS_G.. S_G =e= s_sG*T;
EQT.. T =e= T_D+sum(i,T_Y(i))+sum(i,T_M(i));
EQT_D.. T_D =e= t_tD*I_H;
EQT_Y(i).. T_Y(i) =e= t_tY(i)*p_Y(i)*Y_S(i);
EQT_M(i).. T_M(i) =e= t_tM(i)*p_M(i)*M_D(i);
EQp_M(i).. p_M(i) =e= epsilon*p_WM(i);
EQp_X(i).. p_X(i) =e= epsilon*p_WX(i);
K_D.l(i) = K_DZ(i);
L_D.l(i) = L_DZ(i);
Y_1D.l(i) = Y_1DZ(i);
Y_1S.l(i) = Y_1SZ(i);
Y_2D.l(e,i) = Y_2DZ(e,i);
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Y_2S.l(e,i) = Y_2SZ(e,i);
Y_3D.l(i) = Y_3DZ(i);
Y_3S.l(i) = Y_3SZ(i);
A_D.l(i,j) = A_DZ(i,j);
A_S.l(i) = A_SZ(i);
Y_D.l(i) = Y_DZ(i);
Y_S.l(i) = Y_SZ(i);
A_XD.l(i) = A_XDZ(i);
A_XS.l(i) = A_XSZ(i);
A_YD.l(i) = A_YDZ(i);
A_YS.l(i) = A_YSZ(i);
G_D.l(i) = G_DZ(i);
G_S.l(i) = G_SZ(i);
I_D.l(i) = I_DZ(i);
I_S.l(i) = I_SZ(i);
C_D.l(i) = C_DZ(i);
C_S.l(i) = C_SZ(i);
C_CD.l(e) = C_CDZ(e);
C_CS.l(e) = C_CSZ(e);
CO2_hD.l(e) = CO2_hDZ(e);
CO2_fD.l(e,i) = CO2_fDZ(e,i);
M_D.l(i) = M_DZ(i);
X_S.l(i) = X_SZ(i);
r.l = 1;
w.l = 1;
p_Y1.l(i) = 1;
p_Y2.l(e,i) = 1;
p_Y3.l(i) = 1;
p_A.l(i) = 1;
p_Y.l(i) = 1;
p_XA.l(i) = 1;
p_AY.l(i) = 1;
p_G.l(i) = 1;
p_I.l(i) = 1;
p_C.l(i) = 1;
p_CC.l(e) = 1;
p_CO2.l = 0;
epsilon.l = 1;
I_H.l = I_HZ;
B.l = BZ;
S.l = SZ;
S_H.l = S_HZ;
S_G.l = S_GZ;
T.l = TZ;
T_D.l = T_DZ;
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T_Y.l(i) = T_YZ(i);
T_M.l(i) = T_MZ(i);
p_M.l(i) = 1;
p_X.l(i) = 1;
r.lo = 0.001;
w.lo = 0.001;
p_Y1.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_Y2.lo(e,i) = 0.001;
p_Y3.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_A.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_Y.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_XA.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_AY.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_G.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_I.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_C.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_CC.lo(e) = 0.001;
p_CO2.lo = 0;
epsilon.lo = 0.001;
p_M.lo(i) = 0.001;
p_X.lo(i) = 0.001;
Y_1D.lo(i) = 1e-6;
Y_2D.lo(e,i) = 1e-6;
w.fx = 1;
Model dynamic_rate_based_mcp
/EQK_D.K_D,EQL_D.L_D,EQY_1D.Y_1D,EQY_1S.Y_1S,EQY_2D.Y_2D,EQY_2S.Y_2S
EQY_3D.Y_3D,EQY_3S.Y_3S,EQA_D.A_D,EQA_S.A_S,EQY_D.Y_D,EQY_S.Y_S
EQA_XD.A_XD,EQA_XS.A_XS,EQA_YD.A_YD,EQA_YS.A_YS,EQG_D.G_D,EQG_S.G_S
EQI_D.I_D,EQI_S.I_S,EQC_D.C_D,EQC_S.C_S,EQC_CD.C_CD,EQC_CS.C_CS
EQCO2_hD.CO2_hD,EQCO2_fD.CO2_fD,EQM_D.M_D,EQX_S.X_S,EQr.r,EQw.w
EQp_Y1.p_Y1,EQp_Y2.p_Y2,EQp_Y3.p_Y3,EQp_A.p_A,EQp_Y.p_Y,EQp_XA.p_XA
EQp_AY.p_AY,EQp_G.p_G,EQp_I.p_I,EQp_C.p_C,EQp_CC.p_CC,EQp_CO2.p_CO2
EQepsilon.epsilon,EQI_H.I_H,EQB.B,EQS.S,EQS_H.S_H,EQS_G.S_G,EQT.T
EQT_D.T_D, EQT_Y.T_Y,EQT_M.T_M,EQp_M.p_M,EQp_X.p_X/;
dynamic_rate_based_mcp.iterlim = 10000;
Solve dynamic_rate_based_mcp using mcp;
Set time /2005*2020/;
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Parameter l_GDP,l_CO2,roc_GDP,roc_CO2,dp_CO2,dCO2_,GDPZ_,GDP_,dGDP_
KZ0,LZ0,alpha0(i),lambda_L,lambda_E;
KZ0 = KZ;
LZ0 = LZ;
alpha0(i) = alpha(i);
lambda_L = 0.00237;
lambda_E = 0.04555;
Parameter l_CO2_f;
l_CO2_f(e,i) = yes;
l_CO2_f("foss","p_c") = no;
Display l_co2_f;
Loop(time,
Solve dynamic_rate_based_mcp using mcp;
dCO2_(time,"bau") = ((sum(e,CO2_hD.l(e))+sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fD.l(e,i))))
/CO2Z_all-1)*100;
GDPZ_(time,"bau") = sum(ne,C_DZ(ne))+sum(e,C_CDZ(e))+sum(i,I_DZ(i))
+sum(i,G_DZ(i))+sum(i,X_SZ(i))-sum(i,M_DZ(i));
GDP_(time,"bau") = sum(ne,C_D.l(ne))+sum(e,C_CD.l(e))+sum(i,I_D.l(i))
+sum(i,G_D.l(i))+sum(i,X_S.l(i))-sum(i,M_D.l(i));
dGDP_(time,"bau") = (GDP_(time,"bau")/GDPZ_(time,"bau")-1)*100;
l_CO2(time,"bau") = sum(e,CO2_hD.l(e))+sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fD.l(e,i)));
roc_CO2(time,"bau")$l_CO2(time-1,"bau")
= 100*(l_CO2(time,"bau")/l_CO2(time-1,"bau")-1);
l_GDP(time,"bau") = GDP_(time,"bau");
roc_GDP(time,"bau")$l_GDP(time-1,"bau")
= 100*(l_GDP(time,"bau")/l_GDP(time-1,"bau")-1);
dp_CO2(time,’bau’) = p_CO2.l;
KZ = (1-0.064)*KZ+KZ/1446904*sum(i,I_D.l(i));
LZ = (1+lambda_L)*LZ;
phi(e,i)$l_CO2_f(e,i) = (1+lambda_E)*phi(e,i);
);
Display l_CO2,l_GDP,roc_CO2,roc_GDP,dp_CO2,dCO2_,GDPZ_,GDP_,dGDP_;
KZ = KZ0;
LZ = LZ0;
phi(e,i) = 1;
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Loop(time,
alpha(i) = alpha(i)-(alpha0(i)-0.6523287*alpha0(i))/16;
Solve dynamic_rate_based_mcp using mcp;
dCO2_(time,"lim") = ((sum(e,CO2_hD.l(e))+sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fD.l(e,i))))
/CO2Z_all-1)*100;
GDPZ_(time,"lim") = sum(ne,C_DZ(ne))+sum(e,C_CDZ(e))+sum(i,I_DZ(i))
+sum(i,G_DZ(i))+sum(i,X_SZ(i))-sum(i,M_DZ(i));
GDP_(time,"lim") = sum(ne,C_D.l(ne))+sum(e,C_CD.l(e))+sum(i,I_D.l(i))
+sum(i,G_D.l(i))+sum(i,X_S.l(i))-sum(i,M_D.l(i));
dGDP_(time,"lim") = (GDP_(time,"lim")/GDPZ_(time,"lim")-1)*100;
l_CO2(time,"lim") = sum(e,CO2_hD.l(e))+sum(e,sum(i,CO2_fD.l(e,i)));
roc_CO2(time,"lim")$l_CO2(time-1,"lim")
= 100*(l_CO2(time,"lim")/l_CO2(time-1,"lim")-1);
l_GDP(time,"lim") = GDP_(time,"lim");
roc_GDP(time,"lim")$l_GDP(time-1,"lim")
= 100*(l_GDP(time,"lim")/l_GDP(time-1,"lim")-1);
dp_CO2(time,’lim’) = p_CO2.l;
KZ = (1-0.064)*KZ+KZ/1446904*sum(i,I_D.l(i));
LZ = (1+lambda_L)*LZ;
phi(e,i)$l_CO2_f(e,i) = (1+lambda_E)*phi(e,i);
);
Display l_CO2,l_GDP,roc_CO2,roc_GDP,dp_CO2,dCO2_,GDPZ_,GDP_,dGDP_;
Execute_unload "results_dynamic_rate_based_mcp.gdx", l_CO2,l_GDP,dp_CO2;
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